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I. Introduction
The debate on the role of state ownership in firm performance has largely settled 
on the opinion that the state is inefficient owner because it does not maximize 
shareholders' wealth, destroys incentives by subsidization, slows down restructuring, 
imposes over-employment (among other reasons). Empirically much support has been 
found for the superior performance of privatized and private Grms compared to state- 
owned enterprises. Recently, however, observers have argued that privatization has not 
fared very well in developing and transition economies.^ The suggested explanation is 
that those countries have no institutional hamework that facilitates the efficiency of 
private ownership, consequently in many cases privatization has resulted in asset- 
stripping, tunneling and has failed to attract foreign investments and managerial talent 
and to create functioning market economies in those countries.^ The population has 
become unhappy with economic reforms and is likely to oppose further sales even though 
reforms have positive effects if undertaken with care.^
' Nellis (2001) presents a detailed account of the privatization processes in three transition 
economies. Coffee 1999 describes the securities market failure in the Czech Republic and Poland, 
Economist July 19, 2001 “A Mess; How not to build a private sector” describes the sorry 
condition of privatized textile factories in Iran that has raised renationalization calls.
 ^Stiglitz (1999) voiced the opinion that privatizing in the absence of a sufficient, market- 
supporting "institutional in&astructure” was a serious mistake that could and did "lead more to 
asset stripping than wealth creation.” Johnson et al (2000) for analysis of tunneling, the term
refers to the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of their controlling 
shareholders.
 ^"Most [people] are now hostile to privatisation. And everywhere fewer (though still most) now 
think that the state should leave the economy wholly to the private sector.” "The Latinobarometro 
poll: Democracy clings on in a cold economic climate” The Economist Aug 15*, 2002; and see
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Some empirical evidence based on more than 30 empirical studies on individual 
and groups of transition countries (quantitative synthesis in Djankov and Murrell (2002)) 
suggests that state ownership in partially privatized companies is more than or at least as 
effective in producing restructuring as other types of block and insider owners/
This paper incorporates the effect of the state in a theoretical model for the cost of 
capital. The mathematical results show Wiy it might be possible for some degree of state 
ownership to be efhcient under poor investor protection and weak institutions. I introduce 
the source of inefficiency through the decision of the manager to divert resources &om 
the firm due to poor legal preventive mechanisms. Further, I claim that under some 
degree of state ownership it is more costly for the m anner to steal, because he might be 
compelled to share benefits with the politicians or it might be too costly to hide 6om 
them. Additionally the politicians impose a degree of over-employment on the firm to 
secure votes, which leads to a decrease in company profits. Consequently, state 
ownership acts as a monitoring mechanism that limits diversion but imposes a cost When 
the manager makes the decision to finance investment with new equity, he has to signal 
to the market - characterized by poor investor protection - his commitment to limit 
diversion by retaining some share ownership for himself. In this way he cannot diversify 
his idiosyncratic risk and assigns a higher cost of capital than the optimal rate assigned by 
the market. Ultimately diversion and over-employment result in higher cost of capital and
"The politics of privatization: Arequipa's anger, Peru's problem" The Economist Jun 20th 2002
on the popular revolt against the privatization of two electricity generators in Peru.
 ^See Anderson et al. (2000) for Mongolia, Frydman et al. (1999) for the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland, Lee (1999) and Tian (2003) for China.
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passing up profitable investment opportunities. Interestingly iu some cases the cost of 
capital might be reduced when the state owns part of the company. This happens under 
very poor investor protection when the managers would otherwise choose very high 
levels of diversion, they limit stealing due to their own share ownership, as well as due to 
state ownership.
The empirical part of this work uses a worldwide panel dataset to document the 
effect of state and insider ownership on the firm's cost of capital. Several recent studies 
analyze the relationship between the level of investor protection a firm faces and its 
valuation through the level of managerial ownership and other factors.^ They all use only 
cross-sectional data, since time series data for the level of investor protection or insider 
ownership is not available. Using panel data allows me to resolve some of the 
econometric problems with these studies. Further my treatment of state ownership is 
unique in the literature.
After controlling for unobserved firm specific effects and potential simultaneity of 
ownership and the cost of capital I find that concentrated insider ownership results in a 
higher cost of capital. This is consistent with previous evidence in Himmelberg et al. 
(2001) who use different econometric procedures. In my sample the presence of the state 
by itself also increases the cost of capital, again conftrming that state ownership is 
inefGcient. However, insider and state ownership combined result in lower cost of 
capital.
' Dumev and Kim (2003), La Porta et al. (2002), Lins (2003)
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The set of assumptions used to generate the trade-off between insider ownership 
and diversion can be seen to accommodate a number of real world privatization 
scenarios. The mass or voucher privatization schemes fit especially well, because the new 
owners acquired privatized companies for Sctitious money (checks or vouchers) and did 
not have incentives to get their investment back by maintaining productivity but rather 
wanted to quickly liquidate any valuable assets left and stash the money in Swiss bank 
accounts. Even sales to foreign investors that seem a way to prevent asset stripping, 
because the new owners pay real cash for the companies, can very well St under the 
model. In countries with poor investor protection any rational player (domestic or 
foreign) will take advantage of the system to maximize wealth.^
The present Samework focuses on the cost of co ita l at the microeconomic level 
and does not attempt to measure the macroeconomic eSects of poor investor protection. It 
is then possible to argue that piecemeal liquidation was the value-maximizing strategy no 
matter how the company was paid for and on the macro level the total welfare hasnT 
changed after privatization. However what we see rarely are swift and efficient asset 
sales, rather the privatized companies are used as a vehicle for resource diversion and are 
kept operational. In many instances wages are due for more than 6 months, and tax and 
social security payments are consistently defaulted on.^ It seems the insider/managers
 ^"... even western companies saw opportunities that tempted them to throw corporate governance
and rights of minority shareholders to the winds.” Economist “Grab and Smash” and “Capital 
Punishment” Survey: Finance in Central Europe 9/12/02
 ^Two privatized textile companies in Iran ended up in this position, see footnote 2. The largest 
steel plant in Bulgaria “Kremikowtzi” was sold to its new private owner for $1 (because of huge 
debts) and currently the factory pays generous wages but at the expense of social security
- 4
keep diverting until the limited investor protection mechanisms finally put them in jail or 
force them to run abroad.^
The rest of the p ^ e r  is organized as follows: in chapter 2 1 present a review of the 
literature, while chapter 3 develops a dynamic model of state ownership and investor 
protection. Chapter 4 describes real world implications of the model, chapter 5 describes 
my data, the empirical tests and results and chapter 6 concludes.
contributions. It is able to get away with this because the current administration is willing to close
its eyes (implicit subsidization).
 ^Or as Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) put it: "We have no doubt that management is self-serving 
to the degree that imperfect monitoring allows it to be."
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n . Review of the literature
The main conclusions of the international corporate governance literature are:
(1) ownership matters in non-US settings, and (2) the agency problems are not between 
the managers and the dispersed shareholders, rather between the m^ority and minority 
shareholders. The first conclusion can be drawn from the papers patterned after the 
corporate governance literature on the US, classiSed as first generation research in 
international corporate governance by Denis and McConnell (2003).^ The early 
influential paper by Morck et al. (1988) that finds a significant relationship between 
ownership and Tobin's Q has been critiqued by Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001) among others, because it fails to account for the endogeneity and 
simultaneity of ownership and per&rmance. Once ownership and performance are 
modeled in a simultaneous equations hamework (which is the only appropriate method if 
simultaneity is present) the significance of ownership disappears. The intuition behind 
this result is that in the US ownership structures are in equilibrium and no improvement 
is possible. In the international studies, however this relationship remains important and 
robust.
The second finding that shifts the focus of governance studies is related to the 
varying degree of investor protection around the world, treated systematically by La 
Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) (LLSV). This paper started the
^ Recent surveys of the corporate governance literature on the US are: Hennalin and Weisbach 
(2001) -  boards. Core et al. (2001) -  executive compensation, Holdemess (2002) -  insider and
block ownership, Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) — takeovers.
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second generation international coiporate governance research that uses the measures of 
legal protection developed by LLSV. Researches have recognized however that legal 
factors are not a perfect measure of the degree of investor protection shareholders face. 
Two recent papers by Dumev and Kim (2003) and Klapper and Love (2002) use 
measures of investor protection that are company speciSc and not country wide. This 
paper will treat investor protection in this latter sense and the only time I use country 
level variables is in the construction of sub-samples.
The corporate governance literature is summarized in Table 1. My study 
combines elements of the investor protection and private benehts of control branches of 
the second generation of governance research. My theoretical model uses a partial 
equilibrium hamework at the microeconomic level and clarifes the joint effect of state 
ownership and poor investor protection on the marginal product of capital and the 
expected discounted profit of the company. The empirical investigation in the second part 
of the paper represents a multi-country multi-company study of the effect of ownership 
concentration on the cost of capital.
The conceptual ideas and the empirical investigations in this paper draw on 
several large streams of literature. These include classical agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Burkart et al. (1998)), the effect of investor protection on valuation 
(LLSV (2002), Dumev and Kim (2003), Lins (2003)), the impact of jGnancial market 
imperfections on investment (surveyed by Hubbard (1998)), law and finance (see LLSV
My panel dataset allows me to use fixed effect models, where mean or time differencing 
eliminates any time invariant variables (the level of investor protection can be treated as an 
omitted variable).
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(2000)), state versus private ownership (Megginson and Netter (2001), Djankov and 
Murrell (2002), Boubakri et al. (2002)), and the private beneGts of control (Dyck and 
Zingales (2002)). I first examine the existing theoretical models that have been 
incorporated in the model developed here, and then discuss several empirical studies that 
directly relate to the motivation for this work.
The theoretical models on privatization have generally used several Gameworks. 
Early work is based on the transactions costs between the state and the manager 
(Sappington and Stiglitz (1987)), or the information asymmetries between them (Shapiro 
and Willig (1990)), or the possibilities of bail-outs by the government (Komai (1979)), 
more recent models focus on the lack of incentives for efGcient monitoring of public 
enterprises which causes the transfer of income Gom public Grms to favored interest 
groups (Shleifer and Vishny (1994)). My model incorporates the last approach, vhere the 
politician imposes excess employment to secure votes and monitors managerial 
per&rmance. The monitoring hypothesis does not rely on perfect market incenGves for 
the politician; it simply imposes higher costs of stealing for the manager.
-8
First generation Second generation
Question WHAT is the pattern of corporate 
governance outside the US?
WHY is international corporate 
governance diSerent 6om  the 
US?
Focus Conflict between managers and 
shareholders
Conflict between m^ority and
minority shareholders_______
Characteristics Patterned after US corporate 
governance research; looks at
separate countries__________
Multi-country studies, emphasis 
on legal and regulatory issues
Topics Internal mechanisms 
«Board
« Executive compensation 
# Ownership and control 
o Concentration — block 
premiunis; private benefits of
control
o Insider; separation of control 
and CF rights (pyramids, cross­
holdings, groups) 
o Foreign
o State -  privatization 
External mechanisms 
«Takeovers
o
o
o
o
Investor Protection 
« Country level
o Availability of external 
Snance
o EfScient investment 
« Company level
o Excess cash balances 
Information symmetry 
Valuation 
Rates of return 
Diversification 
Private benefits of control 
« Premiums on voting shares 
in block transactions 
« Tunneling 
« Family ownership 
« Monitoring by outside block 
owner
Convergence 
«De jure vs. de facto 
convergence
« Cross-listing as evidence
Results «Large shareholders are more 
prevalent outside the US 
« Ownership is more important
for performance than in the US
Better protection of investors'
rights results in 
«Better access to Enancing
« Higher valuation________
Table 1. Map of the International Corporate Governance Literature
S'owcg; Zy awfAor baygcZ on fAe Zy Dgn^ oW  AfcConneZZ (200J)
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This paper focuses on (he diversion — punishment element of the model in 
Shleifer and Wolfenson (2000). They derive the managerial going-public decision and the 
market equilibrium, then the authors relate the results to all "basic empirical regularities 
concerning the relationship between investor protection and corporate Gnance." 
Himmelberg et al (2001) use an intertemporal maximization model with investor 
protection but only link it to the choice of insider ownership and derive the result of too 
high cost of capital due to poor investor protection. They show empirically that insider 
ownership is significantly higher in countries with poorer investor protection. Further the 
authors test the equation for the cost of capital and find signiGcant premia for the 
idiosyncraGc risk that the insiders bear because they have retained some ownership. 
However, they do not account for the potenGal endogeneity of ownership. My model 
employs the same ideas but it introduces the role of state ownership, and I employ 
different econometric procedures in the empirical tests.
The present model can also be classiGed under the large monitoring literature, 
where the insider is controlled by an outside block owner. However, the state is a unique 
owner; its incentives and behavior are diGerent Gom those of a corporate block owner 
that may have a monitoring role. A better analogy for my setup would be the role of 
strong unions or the effect of taxaGon in developed economies.
Several recent empirical studies address the role of different types of concentrated 
ownership. Most of them Gnd a posiGve effect of concentrated ownership on valuaGon.
The work by LLSV (2002) looks at the effect of investor protecGon on valuaGon, 
whereas this paper G)cuses on the relaGonship between investor protecGon and state
- 1 0 -
ownership and their effect on the cost of capital. LLSV derive the theoretical predictions 
from a simple model that takes insider ownership as an exogenous variable, while I 
model it endogenously. LLSV examine only the largest 20 firms in 27 wealthy economies 
and find that better investor protection is associated with higher valuation of corporate 
assets, and also find evidence that higher manager/insider stakes are associated with 
higher valuations. In this study I derive a relationship for the cost of capital and my 
findings are consistent with LLSV. Additionally, I use a much wider sample of all 
publicly traded companies that attract investor interest from 37 economies (both 
developed and developing).
Claessens et al. (2002) report that for eight East Asian countries the cash flow 
rights held by the largest block-holder are positively related to value. Claessens and 
Djankov (1999) study Czech frm s and jBnd that frm  profitability and labor productivity 
are positively related to ownership concentration. Gordon and Schmid (2000) report the 
same finding for German Srms.
Dumev and Kim (2003) present the most comprehensive study to date explaining 
the effect of corporate governance on frm  valuation and investment They use two 
sources of survey-based corporate governance (I call it investor protection in this study) 
data that has recently become available and cover 859 companies from 27 countries. 
However, they again focus on valuation rather than cost of capital, do not address the role 
of the state as an owner, and are limited by the cross-section nature of the data. ^  ^
"  Data on corporate governance practice compiled by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia and
Standard and Poor’s disclosure data.
- 11-
Dyck and Zingales (2002) examine control transactions in 39 countries and price 
the benehts of control. They find that high levels of investor protection and law 
enforcement are associated with lower levels of the private beneSts of control. In the 
hamewoik of my analysis, these results support my assertion that in strong institutional 
environments managers choose to retain lower ownership stakes. Boubakri et al (2001) 
test the performance of newly privatized firms in light of the effects of institutional 
development, and empirically conGrm my coiyecture that the performance of privatized 
firms is better in countries with more developed markets and mechanisms for protection 
of property rights. Boubakn et al. (2002) concentrate on privatized companies in 
developing countries only and look at the effect of ownership concentration on operating 
performance. They use an ad hoc empirical speciGcation rather than testing a structural 
equation.
All multi-country studies (including the ones just cited) that examine performance 
have to use accounting based measures, since stock market data from countries other than 
a handful of developed countries is unreliable or unavailable. I avoid this problem by 
focusing on an estimated cost of capital measure.
Djankov and Murrell (2002) perform a meta-study on a comprehensive groiq) of 
empirical papers on privatization in transition economies and are able to make summary 
conclusions with a great testing power based on many test statistics with lower power. 
Their findings suggest that state ownership in partially privatized companies is more 
effective in producing restructuring than other types of block and insider owners. 
Claessens et al. (1998) Gnd similar results for East Asia. However Boubakri and Cosset
- 1 2 -
(1998) conclude that performance improvement is greatest when governments relinquish 
voting control, similarly D'Sousa et al. (2001) report that efficiency gains increase as 
government ownership declines. My model accommodates these conflicting findings 
depending on the input parameters that will diSer for data samples 6om diGkrent types of 
companies and countries.
The empirical issues in the international corporate governance literature include 
but are not limited to: missing data, measurement error, omitted variables/unobserved 
effects, endogeneity and simultaneity bias, and poor variable measures. Table 2 
systemizes these problems. Note that most of the issues can be resolved using panel data 
and simultaneous equations, as I do in this work.
Most of the studies in the international governance literature have used cross- 
sectional datasets which are not suitable to make inferences about the causality of the 
relationship between ownership and performance. Himmelberg et al. (2002) use panel 
data, but do not address causality. Lins (2003) specifies simultaneous equation models 
and does End reverse causality between non-management ownership and Tobin's Q 
values.
-13
Issues Country studies - 
panel datasets
Company studies - mostly 
cross sectional
Measurement error - “
Omitted variables DiGkrence or mean 
difkrence estimators
Cannot be addressed if no time 
dimension in data and no 
appropriate proxies
Endogeneity Instrumental variables, 
lagged dependent 
variables
IV techniques, diGBcult to Gnd 
good instruments
Simultaneity Establish causality by 
simultaneous equations
Use simultaneous equations, 
panel techniques, measures of 
investor protection are time 
invariant
Problematic measures 
of performance 
variables
Growth, investment, 
savings rates
Accounting based measures, 
stock market data very scarce
Table 2. Econometric Issues and Ways to handle them in Second Generation 
Empirical International Corporate Governance Research
My empirical analysis uses a crude measure of insider ownership: the proportion 
of the shares held by owners of more than 5% of the company, but since this measure has 
a 10 year horizon that allows me to employ panel techniques. A much better measure of 
the insider ownership variable in my theoretical model is the entrenchment measure 
constructed by Faccio and Lang (2002) that incorporates the disparity between cash Sow 
and voting rights of the manager. However, curr^tly these are static data and cover 
Western Europe only. I prefer to keep the scope of or analysis as wide as possible and 
retain its time dimension.
12 cash flow to control right ratio" also borrowed by Lins (2003) ("management group control 
rights leverage") and Dumev and Kim (2003)
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Another fact that mitigates the crudeness of my ownership measure is the focus of 
my paper on international companies. The distinction between professional managers and 
outside large shareholders is largely irrelevant in the international setting, because 'The 
management group (and its family members) is usually the largest block holder". This 
is difkrent than the US, where the faction of stock owned by professional management 
is typically less than 10%.^  ^ In non-US jGrms the manager and the largest owner more 
often than not are merged into the same figure.
One can think of my empirical analysis as looking at the efkct of two types of 
company blockholders: the insider and the state. Lins (2003) shows that the presence of 
an outside blockholder reduces the entrenchment of the management, and this 
relationship is stronger in countries with weaker investor protection. I conjecture that the 
state as an owner may have this positive effect as well.
"  see Lins (2003)
Demsetz and Villalunga (2001) report this for dieir random sample of 223 firms.
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III. Model
The model in this p e ^ r  follows the intertemporal utility maximization models 
that lead to Euler equations for investment and consumption.^^ I introduce the source of 
inefficiency through the higher discount rate assigned by the manager of the firm 
compared to the one assigned by the market following the "crime and punishment" 
approach in Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love (2001) (HHL).^^ The novelty in my 
speciGcation is introducing the role of state ownership and its interaction with poor 
investor protection.
After simplifying the inGnite dynamic maximization that results in Euler 
equations, the model can be viewed as consisting of two periods. At time 0 the players 
choose the optimal levels of their decision variables, and at time 1 production and proGts 
are realized. The managers or insiders of the Grm choose a level of diversion that is a 
porGon Gom the proGts of the Grm ). It is important to point out that in this
paper the use of the term insider/manager or manager for short does not refer to the 
"strong manager -  weak dispersed owners" scenario of Berle and Means (1932). Rather 
by "manager" I mean the group of conGolling shareholders and the execuGve team that 
acts in unison. One can argue that there is a monitoring process going on within the 
conGolling group, however for the purposes o f this study I assume that this has been
See Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love (2001), Girchlist and Himmelberg (1998), Hubbard, 
Kashyap and Whited (1995), Whited (1992), Calomiris and Hubbard (1995), Hubbard and 
Kashyap (1992), and Love (2000), refer to Hubbard (1998) for a survey.
They use the ideas in Shleifer and Wolfenson (2000).
This distinction has already been addresses in more detail on p 15.
16-
resolved with a collusion outcome (see Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2002) h)r a similar 
outcome in ûunily owned firms) and I concentrate on the relationships between the 
controlling team and the outsiders. Furthermore, what I mean by diversion is not only the 
illegal activities that can be described as outright theft, but also some legal mechanisms 
of diversion that involve costs. Note that diversion is pervasive in developed economies 
as well; simply the insider/managers have to set up intermediary companies, or consult 
expensive corporate attorneys, or in other ways protect themselves from being punished 
or accept the cost of potentially being caught.
The proGt funcGon for the company is increasing in the amount of capital the 
manager will choose to invest at time 0 , 11^ ^  0 .
A porGon of this company's equity is owned by the state. The state ownership
translates into the actions of a politician who has some discretion over the decisions of 
the manager. The politician wants to improve his chances for being reelected by imposing 
on the firm inefficient over-employment that reduces profits by ,
< 0 . The amount of profit reducGon would also generally depend on the number of 
excess workers, on the wage difierenGal they are getting and possibly on the subsidy the 
poliGcian may be able to direct to the company to induce the manager to comply with the 
imposed over-employment.^^ However, for my analysis it suffices to introduce some sort 
of inefficiency of the state as an owner and I choose to call it over-employment.
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) develop game theoreGcal 
models of the interacGon between the manager and the poliGcian when choosing optimal amounts
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The maaager/msider &ces a punishment technology for diversion , <7  ^)
that is increasing in the index of investor protection t , p* > 0 , in the amount of 
diversion > 0 , and in the amount of equity owned by the state o", p"^  > 0 . 1
assume that the manager will face higher monetary cost of stealing under state ownership 
because he might be forced to share some of the diverted funds with the politician or it 
may be costly to divert without the politician finding out. Note that this effect is separate 
from the investor protection index that also increases the cost of stealing. The second 
derivatives are important for later results: it is reasonable to assume that the marginal cost 
of stealing is greater at higher levels of stealing and under better investor protection, or 
p'*' > 0 and p*^ > 0 ; also I expect that diversion is costlier at higher levels of state 
ownership, or p**^  > 0 .1  will use the following functional form of the punishment
technology: p ( t„ , , cr^  ) = ^  ( t  + ^, where 77 is a measure of the effectiveness of
the politician in monitoring the manager per unit of state ownership (“the scare factor”). 
Then the marginal cost of stealing will be p ‘‘ = {k  + rja)d > 0.
Another way to curb stealing is the option of the manager to retain some 
ownership in the company for himself He offers some equity to the public, but under 
imperfect investor protection outside investors anticipate some amount of stealing, thus
of excess employment and subsidies. Here I simply introduce the resulting inefficiency after the 
bargaining game between the manager and the politician has been resolved.
This term was coined by Neal Maroney when I presented this paper at University of New 
Orleans.
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the manager retains some equity to signal that he will not expropriate them. The manager 
is left with the following net beneht &om stealing:
«^+1 = k  0 -  ^ 6+1 ) + ,  o-g , A:J]. (i)
Equation 1 says that the manager gets a proportion of profits (net of the cost of 
over-employment). That proportion is his own share of the company a  times what is left 
after diversion 1 -  plus the entire amount diverted less the cost of diversion.
To maximize his net beneSt, the manager chooses to divert cf* such that 
1 - cf, O' ), or under my assumption about the Amctional form of ,cr^):
I qilit the maximization in this model into two parts: the static fust stage where
the manager chooses only the optimal amount of diversion, then given this result I 
introduce the dynamic setup of the inter-temporal utility of consumption of the manager.
This approach simplifies work and is widely used in the literature.^^
The manager chooses to steal until the marginal cost of stealing an additional 
dollar is exactly equal to the portion of that dollar (l -  ) that comes 6 om outside
shareholders and the state. This result is a  version of the classical consumption of perks 
condition in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and is present in HHL and LLSV.
20 For example in McGuire and Olson (1996)
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After totally differentiating the Grst order condition with respect to (z, o" and t  I 
can sign the derivatives based on the assumptions about I get:
= ——  = — = and conclude that the optimal
(ft (fa j?'*' (fa p '"
amount of stealing is lower for greater insider ownership, greater state ownership and 
greater level of investor protection.
DiGkrentiating once again involves some third derivatives and they are zero in the
da , „ddd
(f^(f' ^case of quadratic punishment technology:  = ---1 ^  - > 0 and
(f(%ft
(f(T (fCr (f(Ty
> 0 , then I can say that the optimal
(fatfcr
amount of diversion is decreasing at an increasing rate as insider ownership and the level 
of investor protection/state ownership increase. (These results are identical to 
LLSV(2002))
Before I turn to maximizing the manager’s inter-temporal utility, let’s assume the 
manager has some initial wealth and consider the value of the equity the manager 
places on the market:
V .  = (1 -  a ,  -  < T „ X1 -  d ,„ , ïn{ü :,„, ) -  4< J,, k„ )]], (3)
- 2 0 -
where is the market discount factor and I assume that , where
1+ Æ,
is the risk free rate on the market at time 1. This assumption implies risk neutrality; 
however I do not preclude risk aversion of the minority shareholders, 1 simply suppress 
the risk premium to zero because it allows me to parameterize the first order conditions. 
Furthermore, zero risk premium is without loss of generality because my results are based 
on the difference between the risk premium assigned by the manager and that assigned by 
the market and not on the actual level of the risk premium.
Equation 3 says that the value of the stock put on the market is the expected discounted 
portion of net profits. That portion is what is left for minority shareholders (l -  a  -  cr) 
times what is left after diversion l - ( f .
Now I specify how much the manager can consume at time 1 or 
Q+i = + 0  + ^  -  Q  ), (4)
where is the opportunity cost of the manager.
Equation 4 states that at time 1 the manager will have his beneût of diversion plus his 
current wealth net of Investment and current consumption compounded one period ahead. 
The manager's maximization problem is: 
max sulÿect to (1) -  (4)
2 1  -
The above is the Bellman equation form of a standard dynamic maximization 
problem, where the manager interchanges consumption today for consumption tomorrow 
according to the factor and where C/(c) is a standard concave utility function.
In the case of perfect investor protection the manager does not find it worthwhile 
to steal, because the cost of stealing is infinite. On the other hand, outside investors also 
recognize that the manager would not divert and there is no need for him to signal his 
commitment by retaining ownership, he would prefer to divers!^ completely by selling
all equity not owned by the state. (From now on I suppress the subscripts i and t, t+1 will 
be denoted by +1) Then «  = 0 and =0 => = 0 and the maximization problem
becomes;
m ax [/(c )+ y6E'[[/(C+i)], where
C„ = (1+K, X»'+4 K, (nK, ) - j(<7, k))] -K,,-c)
The Grst order condition, using ^  , is:
( l - o - ) £ K , n 'J = l  (5)
Equation 5 is saying that the expected discounted marginal value of capital of the 
6 rm is higher than one by exactly the stake of the state. I then conclude that state 
ownership by itself is inefhcient.
2 2
Assuming l ï  = + (l -  , where ;r is the current level of variable profit and
is the rate o f depreciation of capital, I can linearize equation 5 to become (see Appendix):
Note that for cr = 0 equation 6 says that the expected marginal profit of capital 
(;r^ = ------ ) is equal to the ûrm 's cost of capital or the sum of the risk 6ee rate, the
depreciation rate and the risk premium (a result analogous to HHL). The last right-hand 
side term includes the co-variance between the stochastic market discount factor and the 
marginal profit of capital of the firm. If the company’s return moves together with the 
market return, then thé covariance between the finn’s return and the market discount 
factor will be negative (because the market return appears in the denominator of the 
discount factor). Thus for a positive beta the risk premium term on the right-hand side 
will be a positive number and will add to the cost of capital.
Now consider equation 6 when cr ^  0, the coefficient on is greater than 1 and
— > 0 , this means that under state ownership even when investor protection is
1 — cr
perfect, the cost of capital is higher than it would have been if  the company were entirely 
private. In other words the presence of the state does not have any positive effect because 
investor protection is perfect anyway.
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2  Cage
When investors are not perfectly protected, they expect that the insiders may 
expropriate them. To signal that he will limit diversion, the manager retains some equity 
ownership. Solving the manager's maximization problem given that: +, > 0 ,
(f+i, cr) > 0 , and a  > 0 , the 5rst order condition is:
c ,4 j» . ,n * J + c ,4 w „ n ' 'J = i ,  (7)
M c Jwhere I have denoted ]=  E P- to represent the discount factor of the[/'(C)
manager, c, = a(l -  ) + (/+; -  , cr), and = (l -  a  -  o"Xl "  ^ +1 ) (see Appendix
for derivation).
The linearized form (analogous to the linearization of equation 5) of equation 7 is:
C |  +  C2 Cj +  C j  E \p i.^ Y  J  “*■ ^ 2  +\ J
Note that if , the two risk premium terms will be the same and the
manager does not have to retain any equity ( a  = 0 ), then for low levels of , c, + is 
approximately equal to 1 -  cr and equation 8 collapses to equation 6 .
Here, though, I have two different risk premiums, one assigned by the market: 
cov(M,.,;r^) , , ,  cov(7M,,,;r^) 1  ^ and one assigned by the manager: ---- ^ ^. Note that the manager s
E[M,A  £ k , ]
risk premium represents the covariance between the marginal proSt of the firm and the
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marginal utility of consumption of the manager. Since the marginal utility decreases for 
higher levels of consumption obtained at higher levels of proStability, the Grst covariance 
term is negative. Note that the market covariance term (last term on the right-hand side of 
equation 8) measures the systematic risk of the 6 rm, whereas the first covariance term 
incorporates the co-movements of idiosyncratic proGtability shocks and the manager's 
marginal utility and thus reflects idiosyncratic risk. For the sake of clarity, let's assume 
that the optimal level of diversion is small and so the punishment is also small, the
(XcoefBcient on the idiosyncratic risk premium can be approximated as ------  and the
1 - c r
I   — 0^
coefBcient on the systematic risk premium as —  . I have:
+ ^ __ «  cov(,M+„;r )^ l-or-o-cov(M+„;r^)
Cl 1 - c r  1 - c r  E[M+i]
Now, the higher the managerial ownership of the remaining shares not owned by 
the state, the higher the weight of the idiosyncratic risk premium in the total cost of 
capital. The reason is that the manager is exposed to more of this type of risk by owning 
more stock. On the other hand, if the manager has retained little equity in the firm, the 
majority of the risk reflected in the total cost of capital of the 6 rm will be attributed to the 
systematic risk premium assigned by the market.
In the case of imperfect investor protection, a  # 0, and it is a decision variable. 
The first order condition for a  is thus:
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where and . After substituting for and c% (see Appendix)
I arrive at the following result:
E [m ,,{n (K ^-s(aM =  —^ ± ^ E k ,( n K ,) - j ( o - . t ) ) ] ,  (10)
1-0
To analyze the above equation, first consider the case of no state ownership, then 
the coefBcient in hont of the expected discounted profit by the market becomes 
l - 2 (f^^+1 
1-^+1
< 1. This means that under imperfect investor protection without state ownership
the expected future discounted proGt for the manager is lower than the expected future 
discounted proGt by the market (a result analogous to HHL).
When I introduce state ownership the coefBcient seems to get even lower. 
However, for cr > 0, cf is lower than under cr = 0 and thus the expected future 
discounted proGt Gom the perspecGve of the manager may not be as low as under private 
ownership. This effect comes Gom the assumpGon that the punishment technology for 
stealing is increasing in state ownership.
Next I would like to arrive at a relaGonship similar to equaGon 10, but in terms of 
the cost of capital for the manager. If the manager assigns a higher cost of capital than the 
market, he wül pass up some proGtable investment opportuniGes.
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Following HHL, I assume that the proGt function is homogeneous of degree 1, in 
other words ) = (l)n(Ar^, ). Then I use equations 7 and 9 arrive at the
following expression for j :
g k . n " ] = (11)
which is equivalent to:
^ or, 77, 1 -  B(o-, a ,  77,
V 1 + ^ +1 ^+1 ,
, where
F((T,(Z,77,A;)=
2 (7 -1 - (7(T
1 — oc
1 1
— d(3 + a ) - l  + <j + — ad^ + c d  
2 2
' 2 -  '
V
, and
/
X<T,a,77,A:) = (1 - a -  cr)  ^ 1
\ - a  2 ^  1
1 -c r  (7
To show the intuition behind equation 12 first consider the case of no state
ownership as in HHL. I have the expression: 1-2(7+1 >1
When the company is private, but investor protecGon is not perfect, the cost of 
capital to the manager is above the market and he will under-invesL This result shows the 
source of ineGiciency resulting 6 0 m imperfect investor protecGon. Compare the above to
equaGon 5, the result for perfect investor protecGon: —-— > 1. Again the
1 — <T
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cost of capital is inefBciently high, the crucial result here is that when I have imperfect 
investor protection and state ownership the cost of capital may not be as high.
SpeciGcally, the expression in equation 12 can be below or above *+i
depending on the level o f cr. If state ownership is too much, the negative eSect of over­
employment will exceed the positive effect of the higher cost of stealing and ultimately 
the cost of capital should be higher than under cr = 0. On the other hand, if state 
ownership is below some indifference point, the cost of capital will still be higher than 
the market, but will be lower that the level under cr = 0. To conGrm my intuition 1 need 
to show that the cost of capital is minimized for some level of cr that I call .
Since the expression in equation 11 is very complex and does not provide a well behaved 
derivative, I use numerical simulations in MathCad and confirm the U-shape of the cost 
of capital with respect to cr. The first graph in Table 3 describes a situation where the 
politician is effective as a monitor, the manager is not very entrenched and the level of 
investor protection is low. Then the cost of capital decreases initially as the state retains a 
higher stake. In all other scenarios, the cost of capital is increasing in the relevant range 
of sigma. Note that in the last graph on the left-hand side, the cost of capital rises very 
steeply for levels of sigma greater than 0.40, because for low monitoring effectiveness 
and high entrenchment increasing state ownership has only a negative impact.
Figure 1 is a stylized representation of the first graph in Table 3. It shows that 
state ownership may have some positive efiect up to some indifference level, after which 
the negative impact of over-employment is too great and the cost of capital increases as
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the state owns more of the company. The cost of diversion is decreasing in , because 
the presence of the state limits misappropriation when ;y is high. On the other hand, the 
cost of over-employment is strictly increasing in <T. The joint efkct results in an optimal 
level of cr where the cost of capital is minimized.
- 2 9 -
77 = ,
a  = 0.10
77 =  2
A: = 3 A: = 10
77 = 8
a  = 0.70
77 = 2
Table 3. Marginal product of capital as a function of state ownership
The graphs are generated in Mathcad and represent the behavior of the function in 
equation ( 11) for different level of the parameters a  - insider ownership, 77 - eSectiveness 
of the state as a monitor and - the level o f investor protection. All g r^hs use the same 
values for the remaining parameters, since they do not alter the curve signihcantly:
= 0.05 and s(cr, = 0.5
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G increases the 
cost of capitalG is beneficial
Cost of 
Capital
Cost o f \  
Diversion )pgf of Over- 
mployment
100%.INDIFF0% G
Min E[m+irf ] G
Figure 1: The indifference point for c .
The cost of diversion is decreasing in a , because the presence of the state limits 
misappropriation when rj is high, on the other hand the cost of over-employment is 
strictly increasing in cr. The joint effect results in an optimal level of cr where the cost 
of capital is minimized. Up to some level of state ownership the positive effect of limiting 
diversion is higher than the negative eSect of over-employment, after the indiSerence 
level the over-employment effect is too high and leads to increasing cost of capital.
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IV Discussion
In this section I discuss the applicability of the theoretical predictions above to the 
observed business environment in diSerent parts of the world and the model's policy 
implications.
The investment climate in Russia was summarized in a report by the Moscow 
investment bank Troika Dialog as having the following features: consistent withholding 
of information, dilution of minority shareholdings, delaying dividends, diversion of cash 
flow (tunneling), and asset-stripping.^^ The failure of corporate governance in Russia can 
be very well formalized with this model. Since investor protection is very poor, managers 
choose high levels of diversion that lead to high ine&ciency. Furthermore, the politicians 
in Moscow decided not to interfere too much with managers (low 7/), because the 
managers' clout in workers' unions was too great. Thus we observe high diversion, low 
excess employment and my model predicts that the cost of capital will be increasing in 
state ownership. In other words, gradual privatization would not have worked in Russia, 
because the state would not have been able to mitigate misappropriation. It is important 
to note, that in the case of Russia, the mere act of transferring property rights 6om the 
state to private owners was deemed of the greatest importance and the motivation was 
political reforms rather than economic efGciency.^
21 «Hot shares, bothered investors" Economist 07/22/1999
^  See Black, Kraakman and Tarassova (2000) for a discussion of a staged, more controlled 
privatization. Although politicians have rationalized Ailed privatization in Russia as "economic 
sacrifice for a political victory", Nellis (2001) points out that "cormpt and non-productive"
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The rest of Central and Eastern Europe is struggling with the same problems. It is 
important to point out again that it is not only the local managers that abuse their control 
positions, but foreign block investors are involved as well. To name just a few of the 
scandals: ING in Poland, Credit Suisse First Boston, PricewaterhouseCoopers and 
Deutsche Bank in Russia, Renault and Air Liquide in Romania.^ Therefore, foreign 
direct investment cannot be in itself a panacea for the transition economies, the only 
feasible solution is establishing and enforcing clear business rules.
The case of China is unique, but it also provides a perfect example of market 
failure which was not cured by privatization. The state has kept stakes in all companies it 
has divested (a natural experiment for the role of partial state ownership), and since 
investor protection laws do not exist, my model would suggest that companies should 
perform better than if they were completely privatized. However I cannot test this 
formally since Worldscope data from China is incomplete and all Chinese companies are 
dropped from the sample when I impose my filters.^^
Only a handful of the companies listed on the Chinese stock exchange are private, 
all the rest are partially or entirely state owned. Given that insider trading is pervasive, 
and rights of minority shareholders are completely ignored, it is surprising that equity
privatization has contributed to the continuing importance of Communist party in Russia and 
Ukraine [as well as Bulgaria and Romania].
^  The three scandals are covered by: Economist "Capital Punishment" Survey: Finance in Central 
Europe 9/12/2002; Economist "The Smell Test" 2/22/2001 and Economist "Rights Issue" 
7/27/2000
^  Tian (2003) finds a U-shaped relationship between firm valuation and state ownership in China.
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ownership is so popular with ordinary Chinese?^ One possible explanation is that the 
other opportunities for small investors are so much less prohtable that even with such 
gross disregard for minority shareholders, the stock market is one of the most attractive 
investments.
In the rest of East and Central Asia privatization was heavily used and is well 
represented in the data sample. The economies of those countries (except Japan) are 
dominated by family-owned holding companies, characterized by extraordinary 
opaqueness, multiple layers of subsidiaries, cross-holdings and informal l i n k s . A n  
especially striking example Gtting the theoretical setup developed here is the privatization 
of the Philippine National Bank.^^ The level of investor protection in these countries is 
higher than in China by virtue of the fact that they are democracies and have greater 
transparency and media coverage. Apart hom knowing that they are being fleeced, 
minority shareholders cannot do much else and the players behind these schemes remain 
in business and most likely move into politics as well.^ The parameters in my model will 
be: low because of the collusion of politics and business, low k , but arguably higher 
than that in China or Russia (one positive effect of the Gnancial crisis of 1997 may be the 
potential increased political accountability and the awareness of investors who now
^  Economist “Getting their skates on” 6/1/2000 
^  see Claessens et al. (2000)
27 After acquiring control over PNB through special-purpose linked companies Lucio Tan (the 
wealthiest tycoon in the Philippines) lent $95 mil to his own companies; the loan was restructured 
within months and was never repaid. See Economist "Empires without umpires” Survey: Asian
business 4/5/2001
2* see "Asian eclipse” by Michael Backman
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demand better corporate governance), very high a . This is represented by the last leA- 
hand graph in table 3, and I expect that the cost of capital is only increasing in state 
ownership.
The developed countries, on the other hand, have much higher level of investor 
protection, managers optimally choose lower level of diversion and state ownership has 
little role in curbing inefhciency. However, things are hardly perfect in many of the 
developed countries. In Japan "an intricate network of cross-shareholdings and boards 
made up only of insiders conspire to protect company [executives]".^^ This may make t  
much lower than its level in the United States or United Kingdom and since the political 
process is more sophisticated (at least on paper), it is costlier for the insiders to ensure the 
compliance of the politicians or is higher. This brings us to the Grst graph in Table 3 
where some partial state ownership could have a positive role. Similarly, in Italy the 
examples of Telecom Italia and its controlling owner Olivetti, as well as ENEL and its 
share offering manager Madiobanca provide grounds for the scenario of comparatively 
low k  and higher rj than in emerging markets.^® Since these parameters are unobservable, 
the effect of ownership on the cost of capital remains an empirical question that will be 
addressed in the second half of this work.^^
^  Economist "Japan's corporate governance U-tum" 11/16/2000
^  Economist “Caveat emptor” 10/7/1999
I consider A: unobservable, because the legal protection measures developed by LLSV are 
imperfect and do not reflect company level characteristics, as discussed earlier on p. 7.
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Argentina was an important participant in the global privatization trend in the 90s, 
but its recent economic crisis adds to the conclusion that privatization by itself does not 
solve financial and economic problems. The sale of Argentinean airlines to Iberia has 
raised a lot of attention for its undesirable outcome.^^ Brazil was another example of a 
country with a substantial privatization scheme, however experts conclude that the results 
were disappointing as well.^^
In general Latin America, like East Asia is a region where poor investor 
protection is especially serious since corruption is pervasive in all social and political 
spheres. Given low levels of t  and the current model predicts that residual state 
ownership cannot help in limiting the abuse of power on the part of controlling
shareholders.
Poor and insufficient data from developing countries prevents me from testing my 
model in each geographic region separately.
I now turn to the empirical investigation of ownership and the cost of capital.
Argentinean airlines were sold debt free to Iberia (the Spanish carrier -  as of 2002 one of only a 
few profitable airlines in the world) in the beginning of the 90s. Now the company is facing 
bankmptcy. Observers claim that the entire plane fleet was sold and then leased back at a much 
higher cost, expensive pilot training equipment was also sold and then Argentinean airlines had to 
pay to have its pilots train at Iberia’s facilities.
^  See Macedo (2000); Another recent development in Brazil concerns several large privatized 
companies. They were sold at a premium and the new owners reported the premium as a goodwill 
on the books and showed losses for several years. Now they are restructuring the existing holding 
companies to be able to take advantage of the tax credits and want the state to compensate them 
with new shares in the privatized companies, resulting in dilution of the stakes of Âe other 
shareholders.
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V Empirical part
I examine whether state ownership has positive efhciency eSects under poor 
investor protection by comparing the sensitivity of the cost of capital to insider ownership 
of private companies and companies with state ownership. To do this I parameterize 
equation 8 and convert the variables to observables.
By testing equation 8 however, I essentially skip the intermediate result showing 
that insider ownership is negatively related to the level of investor protection. This result 
has already been conGrmed empirically for the entire sample of Worldscope Grms by 
HHL (2001), and for other samples by Dumev and Kim (2003), Lins (2003) and Klopper
and Love (2002). I am a little reluctant to use the investor protection index constructed by 
LLSV (1998) because it only covers factors of the institutional environment and the legal 
system, some of which arguably have different effects in different countries (see Berglof 
and von Thadden (1999)). When I define k in the model I include not only country-level 
characteristics but also factors such as the type of the company’s assets or the option of 
firms to opt-out or adopt additional provisions in their corporate charter. Although I 
model the level of investor protection as exogenous, I still recognize that in reality 
insider/managers base their decision whether to divert on the characteristics of the assets 
and on the point in time in the life cycle of a given investment.
For example, consider a manager who has a profitable investment opportunity 
available and is contemplating whether to set up a separate firm that is 100% owned by 
him and undertake the project that way or start the project with the current company, of
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which he only owns a . If he sets up a separate company, he will get all expected cash 
flows, however the required initial investment may be higher than if the project is 
undertaken by the current firm, because it already has installed capacity and expertise. On 
the other hand the punishment for "stealing a profitable idea" is less severe because this 
type of diversion is less transparent and more difRcult to implicate. Diverting out of the 
project cash flows after it has been implemented can take the form of tunneling. If, for 
example, the insider wants to buy materials at inflated prices from a connected party, but 
the company is large and visible and has long had established relations with an existing 
supplier, it may be diEGcult to conceal or ju sti^  the change.
Therefore, depending on the situation, managers will optimally choose to divert 
tangible resources after a project is implemented or alternatively "steal the idea" initially.
Since country level legal protection indices are unable to capture the above firm
variation in effective investor protection, I will treat k  as an omitted variable in my 
regressions. The fixed effect panel data technique is well suited to deal with firm-specific 
omitted variables.
There is a hrm-level corporate governance index constructed by Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia, but it only covers emerging markets and does not have time variation. 
This index has been used in an empirical study by Klapper and Love (2002) and they find 
that the hrm level governance measure is strongly positively correlated with the country 
level index of investor protection. The other similar measure is the transparency scores 
compiled by Standard and Poor's, but they too are static in nature. In my panel data set I
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cannot nse these data (except for forming sub-samples), because time invariant variables 
dis^pear 6om the specification once it is mean-differenced.
To rewrite equation 8:
+ 1 , .  A covK ,,;^" ')  cov(M+„;r"')
C, + C ; C, 4-C; C .+ C ;
in terms of observable variables I need to employ the approximating assumptions
that — ^  - and — —  %: ^ ^ . Denote the risk premium terms as follows:
C; 4- C; 1 -  O' C; +  C; 1 "  O'
cbv(/M: ,^,;T^) . , cbv(M+;,;r^) . ,  ' + + 1.1 r  - \ — T— = A a n d  \ ---- T— = A . Now my testable specification is:
—^ ^  + ( l - ^ ) +  -  À + -————A .  To make X and Abe invariant
1-cr 1 — 0 ' 1 -cr
parts of a coefficient in the regression, I specify their behavior as follows: = X  +
and Ag = A + , then I arrive at the following regression equation:
^ ^ 1 = 1 --- — - ( l - J ) + Â  + (^ -Â )-— — 4-w^, (12)
1-0-^
in terms of observables:
10
m—2
(13)
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where )+ satisfies E [ ü ) ^ ] = 0 , ± e
intercept captures all time invariant firm speciGc effects and the nine year dummies 
control for global economic factors across time with similar effect on individual 
companies.
Note that my error is correlated with the explanatory variable. First I observe that 
the error in A could be higher when OlfW is higher, because the manager wül assign 
higher risk premium if a larger faction of his wealth is tied up in the company. But it 
also could be that the insider's wealth is higher relative to the size of the him (recall that 
the insiders in my sample are controlling families or colluding consortia that command 
large resources) and then higher OlFN may not imply higher risk premium. There does 
not seem to be an expected systematic relationship between 1 -  OWN and the error in the 
risk premium assigned by the market. If the insider group is so powerful that it influences 
the perceptions of the market then the departure of (1 -  OWN)A. from its mean will tend 
to decrease as OWN increases. So for the first part of the analysis I assume that the 
combined error term is not systematically related to OlIW or, alternatively, that the 
effects of OWN on the terms involving À and A cancel out.
To address the endogeneity of OMW I need to set up an instrumental variable 
speciGcation. First, since I have the omitted variable problem, I need to use a panel 
transformation that eliminates subject specific effects. I choose to first difference the 
data, since it is easier to implement in conjunction with a two-stage least squares 
regression. In the Srst difference transformation, or are not valid
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instruments for . I could not use higher lags of OMW either, because I allow
earlier values of ownership to determine the current cost of capital (this is the very 
feedback 6om the explanatory to the dependent variable that constitutes simultaneity)^. 
The only approach possible then is to use the simultaneous equations model (SEM) 
approach and use exclusion restrictions in the structural equations. Lins (2003) uses a 
SEM in his regressions of Tobin's Q on different ownership measures. Tobin's Q 
regressions face more severe measurement and endogeneity problems than the marginal 
product of capital relationship used here. However, I follow Lins (2003) because I do not 
want to restrict myself to contemporaneous correlation only (the assumption required to 
use lags as instruments).
In the second half of the analysis I estimate the following system:
A O m r ,, =  +  J2Aln(Z:4)^ 4- (^ 3A T 0_7k^  + (14)
+ ^3Ag/GMlg +y,A(0IF?\^*^7GM4)j, +^2ATD_7M^ (15)
Size is included in the ownership equation, because for larger Erms, insiders may 
employ different strategies to keep efkcEve control of the company (pyramids, cross­
holdings, etc.). Leverage is a control in the ownership regression because the presence of 
debt (which I assume away in the model) acts as additional monitoring mechanism that 
potentially aSects the optimal level of insider ownership. Further, leverage is also a direct 
determinant of the cost of capital and has to be in the second-stage regression.
^  HHL (2001) use three lags of the explanatory variables as instruments, but this is not 
^propriate if I allow for past as well as contemporaneous correlation between and .
-41 -
To estimate my model, I use company level financial data &om Global Access 
Worlds cope covering the period 1992-2001. The database includes 52 countries, with 
different numbers of companies for each country, but only 36 countries remain in the 
final sample after I impose my Glters. I eliminate observations where my estimates of 
AfPAT are higher than 10 (the 95^ percentile), as well as observations where capital and 
depreciation are negative. I also impose the filter that the firms remaining in the sample 
have at least 4 consecutive years of data (a Slter used by HHL).^^
The number of countries having companies with some state ownership is 33. 
There are 50 industries represented of which 33 have companies with state ownerstup. I 
eliminate the Gnancial and service industries (or all 2-digit SIC codes 60 and above). 
Several interesting facts can be noted from tables 4 and 5. The mean net income in US$ is
negative for the private companies in Argentina and the Philippines, for the state 
companies in Indonesia, Italy and Poland, and for all companies in Slovakia and 
Thailand. The most companies with state ownership can be found among Electric 
Utilities and Oil Refineries, which is expected. State companies are bigger in size and 
have higher leverage ratios. Overall OHW in entirely private companies is higher than 
the level of insider ownership in companies with state participation. This result is in line 
with the theoretical prediction of the model that state ownership acts as a monitoring 
mechanism and the manager does not have to retain as high ownership stake to signal
I also need to impose this f  Iter if I want to retain reasonable number of observations when I 
diSerence the data and use lags of the diSerences in the two-stage least squares equations.
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commitment to limit diversion. Bnt having higher insider ownership can be attributed to 
the different historical evolution of state-owned and private companies. If we think of 
private companies in our sample as the result of a gradual empire-building by the 
founding 6mily, then it will be much more reluctant to dilute its ownership because of 
the strong subjective attachment it feels. In the case of privatized companies the new 
owners are not likely to keep insider stakes higher than what profit maximization 
suggests.
To avoid too much influence from the countries with the most companies (the UK 
and Japan), I use two approaches'^. I create two sub samples: the largest 50 companies in 
each country (by total assets) and another consisting of 50 randomly selected companies 
from each country. I keep all companies with some state ownership in the random 50 
samples to be able to detect any differential impact. The top 50 sample contains most of 
the state companies anyway, because they tend to be large. The state companies represent 
less than 10% in both sub-samples.
The data on state ownership is 6om the ownership section in Worldscope, 6om 
Privatization International 2000 and from the World Bank Privatization Database 1989- 
1999.1 had to manually match the names of the companies in the different sources, since 
in many occasions databases use different translations. When there were inconsistencies 
between the sources I relied on the World Bank dataset. Initially I had 189 companies 
with some state ownership over the ten-year period of interest, however after the filter
The number of companies &om the US covered by Global Access Worldscope are only 276, 
the vendor has a separate database for US companies only.
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described above, only 136 are left. I report all regression results for the sample of state 
owned companies, for a comparison sample of US hrms only and for a sub-sample 
consisting only of countries with low investor protection measures (based on LLSV 
(1998)). I classic countries as being low ^ if they have anti-director rights score of 4 or 
less and rule of law score of 7 or less (they are: Argentina, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Israel, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand and Turkey, Venezuela and Zimbabwe). The low A sample consists of 
542 companies, but the usable observations are only 2982 (because those are the 
countries that have the most missing or corrupted data).
The marginal product to capital ( MPAT ) is estimated as the sales capital ratio for 
each firm times an industry specihc parameter thetha (see Appendix 2 for d«ivation). 
The beginning of period capital stock is estimated as property, plant and equipment plus
depreciation minus capital expenditure.
My measure for a  - the proportion of the firm owned by the insider/manager is 
the Worldscope variable “Closely held shares” as a proportion of total shares outstanding. 
The definition of “Closely held shares” is the number of shares held by owners of at least 
5% of the company. I recognize that this is imperfect measure; however, it is the best 
ownership variable available that provides time dimension.
When recording the values for 67GÀM I observe the following rules: whenever 
my privatization sources report a sale, the ownership change is recorded far the following 
year, sales of additional stakes are added to the previous privatized share. I do not record
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full privatizations that have taken place before 1992, so some companies are not 
recognized as privatized, especially in the UK. Based on the variables cr and or, I
construct ^ — . For some of the partially privatized companies there were
inconsistencies between or and c . Specifically, Worldscope reports state ownership as 
part o f the "Closely held shares" measure whenever cr ^  0.05. Apparently, I need to 
disentangle the two. I apply the following rules:
CC (JIf or > O' and or > 1 -  cr, then OMW = -------
1-cr
(XIf or XT and or < 1 -  <r, then OWN = -------;
1 ~ or
If or < O ' and or > 1 -  cr, then OWN = 1 -c r;
If or < cr and or < 1 - c r , then OWN =
1-cr
An example for the first case is or = 0.60, g  = 0.45, if the state is not reported as 
part of "Closely held shares", then or is not consistent, because only 0.55 is left to be 
owned by private owners including insiders. Then the reported or = 0.60 must include the 
state and the true value of insider ownership is 0.15.
In the third case, suppose or = 0.40 and c  = 0.70, then or is apparently 
inconsistent and I assume measurement error in the Worldscope data and force or to be 
equal to the proportion of the shares left for private owners or 0.30. Of course this 
assumption may not be correct and I execute all my regressions with measures of OlfW,
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where the value is set to missing if such an inconsistency exists, and my results are 
unchanged.
The results for the hrst regression analysis are presented in Table 7. Panel A 
includes specification (1) of equation (13) and specbGcation (2) including controls for 
leverage and size for each of the two sub-samples: top 50 and random 50. The coefGcient 
on OlfW is signihcant in all regressions, however the sign is negative, suggesting that 
the cost of capital decreases as insider ownership increases. 67GM4 is not significant, 
which is not surprising given that state companies are only around 10% of the samples 
and the fact that I include an interaction variable. More importantly the interaction 
variable OllW * 67GM4 is significant and positive suggestiug that the effect of insider 
ownership on the cost of capital is less negative when there is some state ownership.
Panel B shows the same two specifications run on the sample of state firms (these 
firms have some state ownership, in many cases minority stakes, but I refer to them as 
"state" companies to be concise), low t  countries and US fhms. The ownership variable 
is insignificant for the state sub-sample suggesting that insider ownership does not aSect 
the cost of capital. The insignificance may also be explained by the smah size of the 
sample and the high variability of the MPÆ for the state hrms.
For the low ^ countries sub-sample the coefGcients are similarly insignihcant. 
Note that more than half of the state companies are in the low t  sample, although the
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total number of Grms is only one third of the number of firms in the Adi samples. It is 
possible that the same deSciencies plague this sample as the state sample.
In the US sample the OIIW coefficient is signiAcant only in the control variables 
regression and again has a negative sign.
Overall, table 7 suggests that ownership concentration results in a lower cost of 
capital and the presence of the state makes this effect weaker. In other words state 
ownership prevents the cost of capital Aom dropping as much as it would have, had the 
company been entirely private. Before I put too much faith in these results, I need to 
examine aU potential econometric issues that may bias my coefAcients.^^
As discussed earlier on page 40 the potential endogeneity of ownership is not 
resolved by the Axed effects estimator. Panel data simply provides lags of endogenous
variables that can be used as instruments. However, lags are not valid instruments when I 
allow current as well as past values of ownership to be related to the cost of capital error. 
Since it is not only endogeneity I have to address, but simultaneity as well, the only 
correct approach is a simultaneous equations model. The system is given on page 41.
Another source of bias not resolved by Axed effects is omitted effects that are 
variable over time (recall the time speciAc decision of the manager whether to divert
HHL (2001) And posiAve relationship in their OLS regressions, I was able to replicate their 
results using the same methodology. However, I must stress that OLS estimates are biased under 
omitted subject specific variables. This is very likely a problem in my (as well as HHL) 
framework, because a Arm's cost of capital depends on its riskiness perceived by die market, that 
riskiness depends on company characterisAcs imperfectly revealed in accounting infbrmaAon. 
The instrumental variable regressions in HHL confirm the positive relationship, but lags o f the 
explanatory variables that Aiey use are arguably invalid instruments when past correlaAon with 
the error term is permitted. Moreover, HHL do not address simultané!^.
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discussed on page 37). This type of problem can only be solved with valid instrumental 
variables.
Table 8 provides the results &om the two-stage least squares regression. The 
coefBcients in the ownership equations are all insignificant, however once I control for 
the potential simultaneity, the three ownership variables all become significant and with 
the expected signs. The coefhcients on AOMW and are positive and signihcant
in the top 50, random 50 and low ^ regressions. The interaction variable is negative and 
signiGcant in the three regressions. These results support the theoretical predictions of the 
model that higher insider concentration increases the risk premium perceived by the 
manager and makes the cost of capital inefBciently high. Further, state ownership alone 
has the same inefficiency effect as insider concentration, again in line with the model in 
the case of perfect investor protection (see the discussion on page 13). Furthermore, the 
negative coefficient on AOWN * SIGMA supports my conjecture that he presence of the 
state has a monitoring effect and limits the inefBciency of insider concentration.
I explain the lack of significance for the state sample with the large variability in 
the data for that sample. Consider the standard deviation of OWN for the state sample 
and the top 50 sample (0.25 vs. 0.23) (re6r to Table 9). The measures are comparable but 
the former consists of 134 subjects only and the latter consists of 1054. This fact may 
create large standard errors and render the coefBcients insigniGcant.
In the US sample (Table 8, Panel B), after controlling for potenGal endogeneity of 
ownership, I find no signiGcant relaGonship. This is consistent with the Gndings of
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Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) who get the same results for US Sims in an earlier 
sample (1976 - 1980), and conjecture that ownership is an equilibrium outcome of a 
complex joint proSt maximization of many stakeholders and therefore should not be 
related to Srm value.
I believe it is important to relate my empirical analysis and results to the 
numerous studies that look at the effect of concentrated ownership (of diSerent types of 
owners) on Sim value, measured by various proStabiSty measures and Tobin's Q. The 
diSerence here is that I focus on the cost of capital.
To show how Tobin’s Q Sts into the model, assume that the profit function is 
homogeneous of degree one, so that ) = (l)n(Ar^, ), for simplicity assume state
ownership is 0 and consider equation 12: j  > 1. Note that
l - - ^ , , ( 3  + or)
Tobin’s Q is the expected discounted after-diversion profit of the firm over the value of 
fixed capital, or Combining the expressions I get:
- 4 9 -
l--(f+ i(3  + (z)
In equilibrium under perfect investor protection the cost of capital as well as the 
ratio of expected discounted proGts to investment should be equal to one. When investor 
protection is less than perfect, both required returns and ^ ratios are predicted to be too 
high. Next notice that a  enters the expression for g with a negative sign in the 
denominator, meaning that g ratios are increasing in the amount of insider ownership. 
However testing this relationship is difficult, because what I can estimate in practice are 
average q ratios but in equation 16 above I have defined the marginal q instead. M orck  
et al. (1988) confirm empirically the positive relationship between ownership and g 
ratios, though they do not account for the simultaneity of ownership.^^
Theoretically (under the assumption of homogeneity of degree one of the proGt 
fimcGon) the expressions for the expected discounted marginal product to capital and the
38 Note the difference from the analogous derivation in HHL (2001), their expression for Tobin’s 
l - - S g ( 3  + t%^ )
2,7 =  1 and their definition o f  Tobin’s Q is:Qis:
1 - J it
r, r , K , ( i - ^ . ) n . „ ]
-^ A+1
Other studies that find positive or curvilinear relationship or identify breaks in the relationship 
between ownership and g" ratios are: Cho (1998), McConnel and Servaes (1990) and Hennalin 
and Weisbach (1991); after including different controls the relationship disappears: most notably
Loderer and Martin (1997), Himmelberg et al. (1998), Holdemess et al. (1999) and Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001). See Figure 1 in Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) far illustrative comparison
between these studies.
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marginal ^ ratio are similar, but empirically estimating g ratios is very problematic and 
therefore I focus on the cost of capital instead.
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VI. Conclusion
In this study the efiect of state ownership and insider control is modeled under 
conditions of imperfect investor protection. I show that state ownership or insider 
concentration individually result in inefficiently high cost of capital. However the two 
types of ownership combined result in a monitoring effect that mitigates the negative 
outcome. The state is a unique owner that does not maximize the present value of future 
expected cash flows, rather it imposes over-employment or subsidizes companies, 
ultimately destroying the incentives for efBciency. The presence of the state has one 
positive monitoring effect vdien the protection of minority shareholders is imperfect and 
they face potential expropriation by the controlling manager of the company. The 
insider/manger commits to limit the diversion of company resources by retaining some 
insider ownership, which results in poor diversification and leads to higher required rate 
of return and underinvestment. Because some state ownership makes diversion costlier, 
the resulting required rate of return is not as high.
The findings are confirmed with an international dataset and econometric 
techniques that handle unobserved variables and potential simultaneity between insider 
ownership and the cost of capital. 16nd that insider ownership concentration or state 
ownership each by itself results in higher cost of capital, however the interaction between 
the two decreases this inefficiency.
To disentangle the ef&cts of different types of owners as well the disparity 
between control and cash flow rights, I am constructing a more detailed dataset for all
52-
Worldscope companies. A more comprehensive study will also include company-level 
international corporate governance data with time dimension that will become available 
in the near future.
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Appendix 1: Derivation of some equations in the text
Equation 6 (page 23)
Using the form of the Grm's proGt assumed above: f l  = ;zr + ( l - t h e  Grst 
order condition 5 becomes now given that
E[M^+,] = — and using = E[a]E[6]+ cov[a,6], I
14-;; / / + Î
^ — (l +  ^- ( l - J ) ,  which is equivalent to equation 6.
1 -cr
get
Equation 7 (page 24)
The first order condition under imperfect investor protection is:
a u (c )  0C
+1
8i7(C„)8C„ 
0C„ 0 ^ „ P U i c )  J
, the FOC
becomes: a c +1+1 aÆ+1
= 0, which is equivalent to (using
Cl =a(l-<f+i)+(^+i and = ( l-a -c rX l- ( f+ i) ) :
C i^ k iU ^  j t  MO + ^+1 X"+i j-M O  + & i k+ i ] = 0. To sim pli^ this
further I need to use the FQC for consumption: 0  + ^ +i )] = 1, now I get equation 7.
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Equation 9 (page 25)
The Grst order condition for is: E /M+1 = 0 , and
Ba Ba + Ba
=c,"(n-î(cT)). = <£[«-., (n-s(<r))].
Substituting the last three expressions in FOC for a  and using E[/M^ (^l + E^J] = l I get 
equation 9.
Equation 10 (page 26)
Cy — 1 + + cc + '
9 a 9a
since 1 - a
A:4-7ya
 , and = I
9a  A + ;ya 9a
have =1-6/+,. Similarly
9(/+1
9a
- - ( 1 - 26/+,)- a
k  + TjCT
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Appendix 2: Estimation of the Marginal Product to Fixed 
Capital
The derivation below follows Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998).
Consider the standard Cobb-Douglas production function: ,
where jy denotes output, is total 6ctor productivity, Æ (property, plant and 
equipment) and #  (intellectual property and other intangible assets) are quasi-fixed 
capital stocks and ^  is variable factor input. I assume non-constant returns to scale. 
Further assume the company faces the inverse demand function: ^ (y ), the variable factor 
prices are w and the fixed costs are F . Now I deGne the proGt fimcGon w, F ) as
the maximum for the optimization problem;
max -  wAT — F
X >0
subject to y  =
The Grst order condition is the marginal product to Gxed capital:
) - w % -F ] %?(y) ^  ^  ^ ^
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Observing t h a t =  or*. and that — — is the price
9Æ ^
elasticity of demand ;/, the FOC becomes: —  = <z F(y)y . 11 +
V 77/
40
Price times output is simply the revenue of the company and let's denote
, then the marginal product to capital is simply the sales capital ratio
77V
multiplied by a scale parameter that is related to the price elasticity of demand.
To see how I estimate hrst note that sales capital ratios are readily 
available 6om accounting data, next I need an estimate of thetha. Since demand elasticity 
is product market specihc, I am going to assume that thetha will be the same for all firms 
in a given industry. Then I want an estimator that has an expectation equal to the 
parameter it estimates. So let the expected marginal product of capital equal the firm’s 
cost of capital in equilibrium and let the cost of capital be the sum of the depreciation rate 
of 6xed capital and the risk ai^usted discount rate: If I substitute the MPÆ in
this equilibrium condition and average over all firms and all time periods in a given 
industry y , I get:
f  1 N T Q N T
h i m
1
As is customary in the investment literature ^  ) is assumed to be
TN  ;,] t=\
0.18. Table 6 reports the estimated ^  for all industries in my dataset.
' Note, that this elasticity variable ly is unrelated to the "scare factor” in the model.
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Table 4. Summary statistics by country and ownership type
Summary statistics show the number of private and state-owned companies by country 
represented in the sample with at least 4 years of non-missing data for the variables of 
interest for the period 1992-2001. is the proportion of the company owned by
the state. OMW is an estimate of the proportion owned by the insiders out of the portion 
of the company left for private owners. I use the Worldscope measure "closely held 
shares" for a  and the state ownership data reported by Privatization International and the
(XWorld Bank for cr, so that OMW =   . MPK is my estimate for the cost of capital or
7t
1 -cr
K ^ itin equation 12,1 use the estimator: y, v te re
"ft
=
/  1 ff r
 ) (O.IS) is industry y parameter that contains the price
TN ;V1 ,„I J
elasticity of demand. ZD 714 (the book value leverage ratio), NI and TA are directly 
&om Worldscope. All summary statistics are averages over aU non missing firm-year 
observations.
jSowcgf." IFbrZckcope, Prrvatfzatfon ThterMCftfowfl, IPbrZcf Baut PrfvatizatfOM database, 
and af/tAar s ca/czdatfo/is.
PaMg/d
Country N D R W Non
Miss
ARGENTINA Private 2 65.34% 21.98% 8.50
State 4 43.70% 59.81% 2.58% 7.50
Total 6 61.88% 9.81% 7.83
AUSTRALIA Private 162 36.86% 10.14% 7.85
State 4 43.09% 48.35% 6.79% 6.25
Total 166 37.08% 10.08% 7.81
CANADA Private 27 48.22% 8.76% 6.26
State 2 72.50% 1423% 3.17% 9.50
Total 29 44.93% 8.32% 6.48
CHILE Private 52 63.34% 5.68% 7.90
State 4 50.24% 52.06% 4.89% 8.50
Total 56 62.48% 5.62% 7.95
CZECH REP. Private 20 65.97% 7.79% 5.10
State 3 84.29% 33.58% 3.80% 5.00
Total 23 61.81% 7.30% 5.09
DENMARK Private 52 29.88% 13.53% 7.71
State 1 62.00% 14.35% 2.35% 9.00
Total 53 29.54% 13.32% 7.74
FINLAND Private 52 39.58% 1423% 8.29
State 8 56.70% 29.93% 8.78% 8.25
Total 60 38.32% 13.52% 828
-  6 6
Country N 0 1 ^ Non
Miss
FRANCE Private 215 60.43% 20.55% 8jO
State 6 82.82% 18.84% 11.24% 800
Total 221 59.33% 20.28% 828
HONG KONG Private 213 54.21% 10.83% 6.46
State 1 53.8794 10.42% 524% 4.00
Total 214 54.04% 10^#% 6^2
HUNGARY Private 3 68.37% 34.46% 6.00
State 8 67.62% 39.87% 11.06% 6 2 8
Total 11 47.31% 17.08% 6 2 7
INDONESIA Private 86 63.55% 10.22% 7A2
State 7 74.78% 28.06% 3.99% 6 2 7
Total 93 61.1994 9.81% 725
IRELAND Private 32 31.8494 9.89% 923
State 1 33.68% 19.08% 11.3894 8LW
Total 33 31.47% 9.94% 9jW
ISRAEL Private 3 67.40% 6.35% 5 2 7
ITALY Private 27 48.89% 16.07% 62 3
State 4 60.47% 27.51% 12.97% 6 2 5
Total 31 46.05% 15.68% 6 2 5
JAPAN Private 752 42.01% 11.42% 9 2 6
State 7 51.44% 45.21% 8.44% 723
Total 759 42.04% 11.40% 9 2 4
LUXEMBOURG Private 2 67.84% 3323% 6 2 0
State 1 29.69% 68.50% 5.45% 1020
Total 3 68.1094 23.31% 7 2 7
MALAYSIA Private 217 47.09% 7jT% 7 2 4
State 16 36.74% 51.1294 7^4% 823
Toül 233 47.39% 7j6% 7 2 0
NETHERLANDS Private 69 47.50% 17.52% 825
State 3 39.35% 47.99% 12.93% 8 2 7
Total 72 47.52% 17.32% 8 2 6
NEW ZEALAND Private 29 61.39% 1L4&% 7 2 9
State 2 74.11% 35.64% 1.5494 5 2 0
Total 31 60.24% 10.96% 721
NORWAY Private 47 43.94% 12.47% 8 2 7
State 2 68.40% 52.04% 8.72% 9 2 0
Total 49 44.30% 12.32% 821
PAKISTAN Private 3 58.77% 19.09% 6 23
PERU State 1 6LI7% 72.66% 0.86% 4 2 0
PHILIPPINES Private 18 64.62% 6.71% 4 2 0
State 3 63.96% 39.63% 6j2% 4.67
Total 21 60.94% 6.67% 4 2 2
POLAND Private 2 58.25% 4jT% 6 2 0
State 9 70.26% 43.52% 9.58% 4 2 9
Total 11 46.76% 82?% 5 2 8
- 6 7 -
Country N 0 ^ A fP X Non
Miss
PORTUGAL Private 8 50.20% 730% 733
State 6 75.63% 17.43% 2.81% 7.00
Total 14 37J2% 5.45% 7^3
RUSSIA Private 2 69.35% 12P% 5.00
State 3 61.74% 48.93% 2.33% 4,67
Total 5 57.43% 1.88% 4 3 0
SINGAPORE Private 117 55.27% 9.30% 6.96
State 3 78.99% 25.85% 11.03% 833
Total 120 54.43% 935% 6 3 9
SLOVAKIA Private 1 61.71% 9.73% 4 3 0
State 2 80.22% 33.93% 2.70% 5 3 0
Total 3 41.8794 431% 4 3 7
SPAIN Private 52 49.78% 10.1594 840
State 5 81.1494 28.00% 436% 6 4 0
Total 57 48.14% 9.72% 833
SRI LANKA Private 7 30.99% 6.41% 8 3 0
SWITZERLAND Private 81 49.30% 12.70% 7 3 5
State 3 46.22% 66.34% 7.53% 7.67
Total 84 49.88% 12.52% 7 3 5
THAILAND Private 80 56,22% 9.98% 5.14
State 8 56.20% 46.72% 437% 5 33
Total 88 55.26% 948% 5 3 8
TURKEY Private 23 65.99% 177M4 531
State 6 72.22% 27.86% 27.12% 6 3 7
Total 29 57.54% 19.52% 6 3 7
UK Private 619 28.33% 14.1194 931
State 7 37.53% 12.70% 5.1594 843
Total 626 28.1694 14.01% 9 3 0
VENEZUELA State 1 42.60% 68.78% 2.90% 6 3 0
ZIMBABWE Private 3 35.29% 13.1794 5 3 7
State I 81.97% 33.39% 1.1594 4 3 0
Total 4 34.93% 10.88% 5 3 5
Total Private 3078 52.58% 12.54% 8 3 0
Total State 142 60.47% 38.25% 631% 6 3 8
Grand Total 3220 43.27% 12.1394 8 3 5
- 6 8
Country N NI(S) TA ($)
ARGENTINA Private 2 19.04% -$1,168 $645,855
State 4 28.36% $387,629 $5,779,493
Total 6 24.89% $242,783 $3,866,961
AUSTRALIA Private 162 22.48% $42,503 $1,204,233
State 4 23.92% $464,979 $ 6 J 2ÏJ48
Total 166 22.52% $52,083 $1,320,152
CANADA Private 27 2639% $91,524 $1,997,775
State 2 45.30% $377,858 $21,563,311
Total 29 27.84% $113,550 $3,502,816
CHILE Private 52 23.40% $4L761 $1,051,721
State 4 31.9494 $69,388 $1,990,293
Total 56 24.04% $O^Wl $1,122,166
CZECH REP. Private 20 12.63% $23,435 $640,862
State 3 17.31% $99,217 $2,347,605
Total 23 13.20% $32,602 $847,323
DENMARK Private 52 30.60% $36,565 $566,559
State 1 37.96% $44,139 $696,251
Total 53 30.73% $36,706 $568,960
FINLAND Private 52 27.98% $67,739 $1,103,201
State 8 40.42% $180,019 $4,493,382
Total 60 29.54% $81,825 $1,528,515
FRANCE Private 215 22.77% $49,940 $2,288,493
State 6 36.25% $404,569 $31,156/487
Total 221 23.14% $59,777 $3,075,426
HONGKONG Private 213 24.20% $55,704 $1,001,999
State 1 28.25% -$6,649 $332^16
Total 214 2431% $55,431 $999,066
HUNGARY Private 3 24.03% -$483 $71,554
State 8 14.66% $62,500 $850,319
Total 11 17.07% $46,304 $650,065
INDONESIA Private 86 44.51% 4 3 2 0 $284,399
State 7 50.30% $78,827 $2,035,395
Total 93 44.89% $4^W1 $398,004
IRELAND Private 32 25.10% $34,038 $728,783
State 1 24.40% $46,723 $760,691
Total 33 25.08% $34^50 $729,819
ISRAEL Private 3 27.36% $16,645 $1,027,470
ITALY Private 27 23.65% $89,036 $4,687,178
State 4 23.71% -$11,434 $5J69262
Total 31 23.66% $76,611 $4,746,799
JAPAN Private 752 293W% $45,770 $5,039,702
State 7 37.25% $628,499 $45,543,050
Total 759 30.00% $50,765 $5,370,431
- 6 9 -
Country N N I($) T A ($)
LUXEMBOURG Private 2 24.57% -$49,675 $1,953,155
State 1 30.58% $82,393 $11,458,797
Total 3 26.57% -$4,134 $5,121,702
MALAYSIA Private 217 28.75% $11,019 $35L8&4
State 16 29.65% $88,848 $2,250,693
Total 233 28.81% $16,495 $485,617
NETHERLANDS Private 69 22.65% $128,720 $2,214,820
State 3 24.48% $423,445 $12,220,078
Total 72 22.72% $139,956 $2,596,252
NEW ZEALAND Private 29 27.72% $32,741 $725,643
State 2 29.09% $13,693 $220,843
Total 31 27.78% $31,777 $700,207
NORWAY Private 47 31.69% $41,986 $1,042,267
State 2 26.95% $383,791 $9,484,173
Total 49 31.4994 $56,847 $1,409,307
PAKISTAN Private 3 17.29% $25,502 $212,936
PERU State 1 193#% $55,247 $1,167,847
PHILIPPINES Private 18 27.18% -$2,086 $246,553
State 3 22.04% $63,533 $1,213,893
Total 21 26.30% $9,470 $41^858
POLAND Private 2 7.45% -$18,016 $202,701
State 9 11.27% $22,667 $804,212
Total 11 10.40% $12,952 $660,567
PORTUGAL Private 8 25.28% $12,769 $227,856
State 6 27.43% $185,182 $4,730,017
Total 14 26.16% $83,582 $2,076,958
RUSSIA Private 2 &93% $253,307 $5,138,558
State 3 16.1194 $332,184 $6,387,732
Total 5 12.04% $300,633 $5,888,063
SINGAPORE Private 117 22.25% $17,114 $452,159
State 3 1&5#% $384,535 $2,625,785
Total 120 22.09% $27,341 $513,229
SLOVAKIA Private 1 20.84% -$111,155 $1,294,047
State 2 3R27% -$3,085 $159,440
Total 3 27.57% -$33,962 $483,613
SPAIN Private 52 20.33% $53,877 $1,634,639
State 5 18.90% $499,902 $15,584,823
Total 57 20.22% $87,439 $2,684,356
SRI LANKA Private 7 21.77% $3,692 $79,654
SWITZERLAND Private 81 2&92% $42,397 $1,186,779
State 3 47.23% $431,658 $4,619,919
Total 84 27.63% $55,941 $^30^231
THAILAND Private 80 41.8994 $L492 $281,803
State 8 44.32% $26,003 $1,093,418
Total 88 42.10% $3,652 $353^25
70
Country N N I($) T A ($)
TURKEY Private 23 21.31% $13,464 $131,675
State 6 16.04% $24,566 $195,680
Total 29 20.17% $15,868 $145,531
UK Private 619 19.29% $62,836 $1^W1^W5
State 7 22.89% $1,268,403 $24,076,735
Total 626 19.33% $75,407 $1,627,899
VENEZUELA State 1 10.46% $226,340 $5,898,707
ZIMBABWE Private 3 13.30% $7J53 $78,594
State 1 22.81% $6J[63 $135,753
Total 4 15.1134 $7JZ6 $8R,481
Total Private 3078 23.84% $32,942 $1,211,377
Total State 142 27.47% $222,477 $7,071,804
Grand Total 3220 26.04% $54,723 $2,482,117
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Table 5. Summary statistics by industry and ownership type
Summary statistics show the number of private and state-owned companies by 2 digit 
industry code represented in the sample with at least 4 years of non-missing data for the 
variables of interest for the period 1992-2001. is the proportion of the company
owned by the state. OfFW is an estimate of the proportion owned by the insiders out of 
the portion of the company left for private owners. I use the Worldscope measure 
"closely held shares" for a  and the state ownership data reported by Privatization
International and the World Bank for o", so that OMW = r —— - MPK is my estimate for
1-c r
the cost of capital or in equation 12,1 use the estimator: , where
1 /  \  1 (O.IS) is industry y parameter that contains the price
7 ^  M /-I /
elasticity of demand. 2D _ 214 (the book value leverage ratio), NI and TA are directly 
6om Worldscope. All summary statistics are averages over all non missing Srm-year 
observations.
Pang/ yf
Industry 2 digit 
SIC
code
State N 52G M 4 DIPW
Agricultural production- crops 1 Private 12 56.34% 11.37%
Agricultural production- 
livestock
2 Private 8 39.81% 13.68%
Agricultural services 7 Private 3 24.03% 9.84%
Forestry 8 Private 18 54.88% 2.44%
Fishing, hunting, and trapping 9 Private 4 35.50% 18.00%
Metal mining 10 Private 53 46.96% 2.12%
State 3 48.75% 69.10% 0.95%
10 Total Total 56 48.00% 2.08%
Coal mining 12 Private 12 50.86% 2.49%
State 1 81.97% 33.39% 1.15%
12 Total Total 13 50.12% 2.44%
Oil and gas extraction 13 Private 52 40.18% 221%
State 6 57.36% 52.06% 425%
13 Total Total 58 41.19% 2.42%
Nonmetallic minerals, except 
fuels
14 Private 16 32.96% 3.65%
General building contractors 15 Private 123 38.82% 8.68%
72-
Industry 2 digit 
SIC
code
State N
Heavy construction contractors 16 Private 54 43.39% 9.26%
State 3 72.00% 31.51% 6.14%
16 Total Total 57 42.87% 9.12%
Special trade contractors 17 Private 24 46.90% 11.23%
State 2 37.72% 45.81% 2.47%
17 Total Total 26 46.83% 10.57%
Food and kindred products 20 Private 223 47.59% 15.57%
State 7 54.52% 25.83% ' 14.70%
20 Total Total 230 47.05% 15.55%
Tobacco manufactures 21 Private 10 54.36% 30.78%
State 1 70.09% 48.16% 25.17%
21 Total Total 11 53.84% 30.27%
Textile mill products 22 Private 60 43.90% 15.43%
State 1 100.00% 0.00% 3.81%
22 Total Total 61 43.11% 1524%
Apparel and other textile 
products
23 Private 50 46.82% 24.49%
State 1 40.00% 52.29% 16.18%
23 Total Total 51 46.93% 24.34%
Lumber and wood products 24 Private 28 45.81% 10.19%
State 1 15.10% 49.81% 4.56%
24 Total Total 29 45.96% 9.96%
Furniture and fixtures 25 Private 32 40.37% 19.42%
Paper and allied products 26 Private 65 41.21% 12.08%
State 3 59.48% 23.66% 2.66%
26 Total Total 68 40.53% 11:67%
Printing and publishing 27 Private 74 42.66% 18.71%
State 1 1.42% 48.68% 14.76%
27 Total Total 75 42.73% 18.67%
Chemicals and allied products 28 Private 210 39.67% 13.79%
State 9 59.03% 46.07% 7.54%
28 Total Total 219 39.89% 13.58%
Petroleum and coal products 29 Private 17 48.64% 16.11%
State 10 70.87% 27.03% 12.35%
29 Total Total 27 40.70% 14.78%
Rubber and miscellaneous 
plastics products
30 Private 53 50.49% 9.65%
Leather and leather products 31 Private 16 42.48% 18.50%
Stone, clay, glass, and concrete
products
32 Private 111 44.68% 6.44%
State 6 42.57% 60.44% 3.86%
32 Total Total 117 45.38% 6.32%
73-
Industry 1 digit 
SIC 
code
State N O IFN
Primary metal industries 33 Private 85 42.47% 10.27%
State 7 64.61% 41.69% 6.82%
33 Total Total 92 42.42% 10.06%
Fabricated metal products 34 Private 87 44.36% 13.15%
State 1 77.74% 32.47% 16.90%
34 Total Total 88 44.28% 13.18%
Industrial machinery and 
equipment
35 Private 189 39.34% 15.14%
State 2 20.80% 49.65% 15.15%
35 Total Total 191 39.43% 15.14%
Electrical and electronic 
equipment
36 Private 225 44.68% 14.90%
State 3 40.08% 43.78% 15.19%
36 Total Total 228 44.67% 14.90%
Transportation equipment 37 Private 95 44.35% 13.34%
State 4 69.13% 37.71% 12.51%
37 Total Total 99 44.11% 13.31%
Instruments and related 
products
38 Private 79 37.36% 14.42%
State 3 71.83% 10.49% 18.70%
38 Total Total 82 36.49% 14.56%
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
industries
39 Private 35 45.44% 13.80%
Local and interurban passenger 
transit
40 Private 5 26.45% 9.71%
State 3 45.13% 44.26% 2.32%
40 Total Total 8 32.49% 7.13%
Motor freight transportation and 
warehousing
41 Private 15 35.31% 7.76%
State 1 75.50% 35.00% 6.34%
41 Total Total 16 35.29% 7.69%
Postal Service 42 Private 25 44.38% 15.89%
State 1 34.80% 64.84% 30.91%
42 Total Total 26 44.91% 16.27%
Water transportation 44 Private 63 46.44% 11.39%
State 3 37.90% 24.28% 2.45%
44 Total Total 66 45.54% 11.03%
Transportation by air 45 Private 19 43.09% 15.35%
State 8 70.14% 19.55% 7.10%
45 Total Total 27 36.67% 12.85%
Transportation services 47 Private 36 47.98% 21.82%
State 1 32.34% 77.77% 19.97%
47 Total Total 37 48.59% 21.78%
74-
Industry 2 digit 
SIC 
code
State N 57G M 4
Communications 48 Private 75 47.40% 20.12%
State 21 65.52% 34.12% 5.36%
48 Total Total 96 44.55% 16.85%
Electric, gas, and sanitaiy
services
49 Private 100 44.43% 8.05%
State 20 63.51% 36.74% 4.03%
49 Total Total 120 43.37% 7.47%
Wholesale trade—durable goods 50 Private 178 41.51% 10.85%
State 3 55.89% 34.65% 10.53%
50 Total Total 181 41.40% 10.85%
Wholesale trade—nondurable 
goods
51 Private 129 46.57% 9.53%
State 2 71.75% 78.05% 3.79%
51 Total Total 131 47.02% 9.43%
Building materials, hardware, 
garden supply, & mobile
52 Private 11 35.97% 8.26%
General merchandise stores 53 Private 79 41.51% 6.33%
Food stores 54 Private 41 46.85% 6.83%
State 1 67,24% 47.17% 25.81%
54 Total Total 42 46.86% 6.89%
Automotive dealers and 
gasoline service stations
55 Private 20 46.08% 13.50%
Apparel and accessory stores 56 Private 38 45.05% 9.51%
Furniture, home furnishings and 
equipment stores
57 Private 28 45.31% 9.07%
Eating and drinking places 58 Private 47 38.05% 4.38%
State 1 10.63% 48.47% 3.16%
58 Total Total 48 38.29% 4.35%
Miscellaneous retail 59 Private 46 47.45% 9.55%
State 2 75.80% 15.47% 6.51%
59 Total Total 48 46.51% 9.45%
All Industries Private 3078 43.50% 12.31%
State 142 56.98% 37.40% 7.61%
Total 3220 43.27% 12.13%
-75
Industry 2 digit 
SIC 
code
State N M (S ) T A ($)
Agricultural production- 
crops
1 Private 12 15.00% $10,530 $260,839
Agricultural production- 
livestock
2 Private 8 28.15% $22,214 $410,845
Agricultural services 7 Private 3 16.74% $10,241 $196,750
Forestry 8 Private 18 17.10% $8,687 $239,832
Fishing, hunting, and 
trapping
9 Private 4 41.54% $286 $1,505,121
Metal mining 10 Private 53 21.97% $57,201 $1,602,107
State 3 7.33% $7,491 $180,129
10 Total Total 56 21.24% $54,741 $1,531,596
Coal mining 12 Private 12 19.54% $19,064 $429,821
State 1 22.81% $6,163 $135,753
12 Total Total 13 19.67% $18,577 $418,724
Oil and gas extraction 13 Private 52 18.99% $57,113 $1,712,845
State 6 23.82% $255,325 $3,996,445
13 Total Total 58 19.46% $76,893 $1,936,447
Nonmetallic minerals, 
except fuels
14 Private 16 29.14% $95,402 $1,682,580
General building contractors 15 Private 123 27.36% $18,143 $3,146,872
Heavy construction 
contractors
16 Private 54 20.19% $25,188 $2,158,048
State 3 13.34% $87,308 $1,628,402
16 Total Total 57 19.88% $27,932 $2,134,650
Special trade contractors 17 Private 24 14.80% $27,037 $1,227,628
State 2 35.34% $95,565 $2,640,380
17 Total Total 26 16.24% $31,851 $1,326,871
Food and kindred products 20 Private 223 25.20% $40,564 $1,192,613
State 7 32.68% $21,753 $432,305
20 Total Total 230 25.39% $40,094 $1,173,597
Tobacco manufactures 21 Private 10 27.42% $312,173 $6,978,886
State 1 10.14% $541,823 $19,139,081
21 Total Total 11 25.84% $337,976 $8,345,200
Textile mill products 22 Private 60 31.13% $3,063 $469,603
State 1 45.96% $24,443 $523,780
22 Total Total 61 31.38% $3,419 $470,506
Apparel and other textile 
products
23 Private 50 28.13% $8,488 $388,460
State 1 18.59% $2,231 $102,652
23 Total Total 51 27.96% $8,377 $383,379
Lumber and wood products 24 Private 28 33.47% $16,523 $566,127
State 1 45.95% $402,385 $11,118,740
24 Total Total 29 33.97% $32,020 $989,927
- 76 -
Industry 2 digit 
SIC 
code
State N N I($) T A ($)
Furniture and fixtures 25 Private 32 20.46% $11,694 $400,805
Paper and allied products 26 Private 65 31.59% $40,873 $1,772,070
State 3 33.95% $20,317 $716,156
26 Total Total 68 31.69% $39,963 $1,725,333
Printing and publishing 27 Private 74 22.36% $60,873 $1352,015
State 1 7.86% $19,601 $165,702
27 Total Total 75 22.22% $60,455 $1,240,995
Chemicals and allied 
products
28 Private 210 25.75% $54,018 $2,200,168
State 9 19.75% $99,366 $1,548,563
28 Total Total 219 25.55% $55,537 $2,178,337
Petroleum and coal products 29 Private 17 25.83% $545,433 $13,907,434
State 10 27.06% $737,465 $17,485,857
29 Total Total 27 26.28% $615,553 $15,214,078
Rubber and miscellaneous 
plastics products
30 Private 53 27.69% $23,833 $1351,885
Leather and leather products 31 Private 16 25.79% $73,871 $2,877,114
Stone, clay, glass, and 
concrete products
32 Private 111 28.75% $40,406 $1,522390
State 6 33.22% $45,004 $952,333
32 Total Total 117 28.96% $40,616 $1,496328
Primary metal industries 33 Private 85 30.41% $25,308 $3,136,892
State 7 29.79% $50,988 $5371,637
33 Total Total 92 3038% $26,892 $3,268,416
Fabricated metal products 34 Private 87 24.56% $15,617 $839,469
State 1 12.12% -$3,045 $92307
34 Total Total 88 24.45% $15,455 $832,980
Industrial machinery and 
equipment
35 Private 189 24.09% $27,445 $2,180,774
State 2 36.61% $67,550 $2,183,571
35 Total Total 191 24.19% $27,763 $2,180,796
Electrical and electronic 
equipment
36 Private 225 22.90% $48,646 $2,754,205
State 3 22.54% $14,736 $203,607
36 Total Total 228 22.90% $48,226 $2,722,544
Transportation equipment 37 Private 95 24.89% $72,571 $5,576,583
State 4 25.01% $210,334 $13,470340
37 Total Total 99 24.90% $77,464 $5,857,562
Instruments and related 
products
38 Private 79 24.50% $28,440 $1,350,528
State 3 30.36% -$98,938 $10,740,676
38 Total Total 82 24.70% $24300 $1,663,116
Miscellaneous 
manufacturing industries
39 Private 35 20.65% $57,637 $1,052,783
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Industry 2 digit 
SIC 
code
State N N I($) T A ($)
Local and interurban 
passenger transit
40 Private 5 41.85% $86,860 $8,388,622
State 3 57.81% $391,797 $47,628,483
40 Total Total 8 47.34% $201,211 $23,103,570
Motor freight transportation 
and warehousing
41 Private 15 50.58% $27,493 $2,892,251
State 1 4.67% $20,719 $307,338
41 Total Total 16 48.41% $27,172 $2,769,992
Postal Service 42 Private 25 28.21% $27,989 $1,395,120
State 1 19.31% $430,521 $6,355,763
42 Total Total 26 27.99% $38,137 $1,520,179
Water transportation 44 Private 63 38.15% $33,065 $1,340,903
State 3 25.94% $17,649 $241,712
44 Total Total 66 37.67% $32,454 $1,297,371
Transportation by air 45 Private 19 42.45% $103,478 $4,426,582
State 8 42.68% $18,849 $3,956,876
45 Total Total 27 42.52% $78,466 $4,289,107
Transportation services 47 Private 36 23.33% $42,340 $1,022,137
State 1 33.16% $36,871 $711,823
47 Total Total 37 23.52% $42,212 $1,015,910
Communications 48 Private 75 28.72% $79,168 $3,290,167
State 21 27.71% $800,007 $23,927,326
48 Total Total 96 28.51% $234,177 $7,675,221
Electric, gas, and sanitary 
services
49 Private 100 31.94% $141,695 $7,059,890
State 20 34.57% $220,941 $6,823,087
49 Total Total 120 32.32% $153,159 $7,025,668
Wholesale trade—durable 
goods
50 Private 178 25.11% $27,791 $2,215,123
State 3 43.39% $59,351 $2,598,173
50 Total Total 181 25.41% $28,305 $2,221,371
Wholesale trade-nondurable 
goods
51 Private 129 25.12% $24,661 $1,932,103
State 2 4.89% $112,635 $1,409,418
51 Total Total 131 24.85% $25,841 $1,925,093
Building materials, 
hardware, garden supply, &
mobile
52 Private 11 22.26% $24,562 $509,641
General merchandise stores 53 Private 79 31.56% $44,170 $3,339,251
Food stores 54 Private 41 24.06% $116,961 $2,538,221
State 1 7.55% $27,317 $291,247
54 Total Total 42 23.83% $115,752 $2,507,938
Automotive dealers and 
gasoline service stations
55 Private 20 25.00% $10,799 $296,415
Apparel and accessory stores 56 Private 38 20.21% $8,151 $554,495
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Industry 2 digit 
SIC 
code
State N N I($) T A ($)
Furniture, home furnishings 
and equipment stores
57 Private 28 19.30% $18,876 $472,794
Eating and drinking places 58 Private 47 21.85% $33,616 $720,926
State 1 34.45% $8,782 $211,273
58 Total Total 48 22.16% $33,017 $708,675
Miscellaneous retail 59 Private 46 20.81% $118,689 $1,974,211
' State 2 15.26% $19,079 $138,892
59 Total Total 48 20.64% $115,678 $1,918,596
All Industries Private 3078 25.92% $46,353 $2,227,291
State 142 29.12% $260,572 $8,780,843
Total 3220 26.04% $54,723 $2,482,117
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Table 6. Estimated values of thetha per indust:y
Thetha is a quasi-elasticity of demand measure used in the estimation of the MPÆ for 
each firm, based on the assumptions for: a standard Cobb-Douglas production function 
and firms are at their equilibrium capital stocks. It can be shown that (see derivation in
Appendix 2) MPÆ = ^ — , and thetha can be estimated as:
K
1 or the cost of capital is a sales capital
M /-I
1 ^ /ratio times an industry-specihc elasticity parameter. J  is taken to be
{TN)j
0.18 for all industries (value used by many researchers).
Industry 2 digit SIC
code ^7
Agricultural production- crops 1 0.0532
Agricultural production- livestock 2 0.0308
Agricultural services 7 0.0211
Forestry 8 0.0151
Fishing, hunting, and trapping 9 0.0290
Metal mining 10 0.1369
Coal mining 12 0.1135
Oil and gas extraction 13 0.1008
Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels 14 0.0719
General building contractors 15 0.0066
Heavy construction contractors 16 0.0251
Special trade contractors 17 0.0207
Food and kindred products 20 0.0443
Tobacco manufactures 21 0.0284
Textile mill products 22 0.0465
Apparel and other textile products 23 0.0263
Lumber and wood products 24 0.0789
Furniture and fixtures 25 0.0366
Paper and allied products 26 0.0623
Printing and publishing 27 0.0350
Chemicals and allied products 28 0.0549
Petroleum and coal products 29 0.0386
Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 30 0.0575
Leather and leather products 31 0.0248
Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 32 0.0628
Primary metal industries 33 0.0541
Fabricated metal products 34 0.0415
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Industry 2 digit SIC
code ^7
Industrial machinery and equipment 35 0.0179
Electrical and electronic equipment 36 0.0317
Transportation equipment 37 0.0390
Instruments and related products 38 0.0361
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 39 0.0307
Local and interurban passenger transit 40 0.1961
Motor freight transportation and warehousing 41 0.1484
U.S. Postal Service 42 0.0704
Water transportation 44 0.0978
Transportation by air 45 0.0276
Transportation services 47 0.0210
Communications 48 0.0589
Electric, gas, and sanitary services 49 0.1251
Wholesale trade-durable goods 50 0.0111
Wholesale trade—nondurable goods 51 0.0119
Building materials, hardware, garden supply, & mobile 52 0.0119
General merchandise stores 53 0.0364
Food stores 54 0.0309
Automotive dealers and gasoline service stations 55 0.0187
Apparel and accessory stores 56 0.0248
Furniture, home furnishings and equipment stores 57 0.0201
Eating and drinking places 58 0.0335
Miscellaneous retail 59 0.0134
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Table 7. The Relationship between Inside Ownership and the Cost of Capital
Fixed effects panel regressions of the dependent variable MPK on the measure of insider 
ownership (OWN), an interactive variable OWN* SIGMA and controls. The variables are 
dehned in tables 4 and 5. Regression (1) is testing structural equation (12), regression (2) 
includes controls. Top 50 is a sample including the largest 50 hrms in each of the 
countries in the sample having 5 Grms or more. Random 50 is a sample consisting of 
random sub-samples of Grms from each country having 5 firms or more. Firm speciGc 
intercepts and year dummy coefficients are not reported. The p-values for tests of 
equality of each coefhcient to zero are in parentheses, the test statistics are calculated 
based on heteroskedasticity and serial correlation robust errors.
Top 50 Random 50
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Individual specific
intercepts Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ln(TA) -0.0115** -0.0140**
(0.0003) (0.0003)
TD/TA -0.0719** -0.0541**
(<.0001) (0.0037)
SIGMA -0.006 -0.0097 0.0144 0.0077
(0.4028) (0.1915) (0.4763) (0.6692)
OWN -0.0221** -0.0220** -0.0218** -0.0219**
(0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0013)
0WN*S1GMA 0.536** 0.0324* 0.0601** 0.0420*
(0.0013) (0.0393) (0.0012) (0.0156)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of observations 8116 8115 8434 8433
No of firms 1064 1064 1135 1135
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State Low t US
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Individual
specific
intercepts
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ln(TA) -0.0162
(0.4005)
-0.0220**
(0.0003)
-0.0180*
(0.0175)
TD/TA -0.0811**
(0.0029)
-0.0312**
(0.0028)
-0.0741**
(0.0022)
SIGMA 0.0094
(0.4732)
0.0050
(0.6934)
0.0824
(0.0639)
0.0406
(0.2652)
OWN -0.0419
(0.4299)
-0.0357
(0.3995)
0.0192
(0.2253)
0.0049
(0.7533)
-0.0046
(0.7594)
-0.0375**
(0.0102)
OWN*SIGMA 0.0776
(0.3574)
0.0612
(0.3592)
-0.0164
(0.6465)
0.0017
(0.9614)
Year dummies Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
No of obs. 949 949 3644 3643 2536 2534
No of firms 136 136 542 542 276 276
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Table 8. Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation of Insider Ownership and the Cost of 
Capital
Two-stage least squares regressions of the dependent variable AAfPÆ on the measure of 
insider ownership ( AOMW ), an interactive variable AOllW * 67GM4 and controls. The 
original variables are defined in tables 4 and 5, here I use a hrst differencing 
transformation. The dependent variable in the first-stage regression is AOMW, the 
instruments are only the controls. Random 50 is a sample consisting of random sub­
samples of firms 6om each country having 5 Grms or more. Firm specihc and year 
dummy coefficients are not reported. The p-values for tests of equality of each coefhcient 
to zero are in parentheses, the test statistics are calculated based on heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation robust errors.
Top 50 Random 50
AMPÆ
Aln(7:4) -0.297
(0.1042)
-3.58
(0.7469)
AT0/7M -0.0798**
(<.0001)
-0.9404
(0.1255)
-0.0678**
(<.0001)
-14.47
(0.7479)
A57GM4 0.3096*
(0.0139)
0.2206*
(0.0111)
A o m r 0.8311*
(0.0123)
0.6245**
(0.0084)
-1.2366*
(0.0122)
-0.9552**
(0.0082)
AÀfPÆ -21.1
(0.1074)
-313.43
(0.7472)
No of
observations
6876 7080
Adjusted R^ 0.00207 0.0000 0.00359 0.0000
84-
State Low t US
AMP.fi: AOllW AMP^ AOl^W AMPÆ AOPKN
Aln(7M) -1.7859
(0.6192) 0.0990*
(0.0241)
-0.0279
(0.9072)
-0.0339
(0.3228)
-12.989
(0.5826)
-0.0079
(0.7258) 0.1116*
(0.0373)
-0.0731
(<0001)
0.9973
(0.7577)
A57GM4 -0.1247
(0.3116)
0.5183*
(0.0471)
A O f^ -0.3688
(0.2949)
1.2446*
(0.0377)
0.1146
(0.1550)
A 0 ^ * 5 7 G M 4 0.5552
(0.3005)
-1.9830*
(0.374)
AMPÆ -220.99
(0.5804) 3.6095*
(0.0380)
14.93
(0.7880)
No of obs. 793 2982 2247
Adjusted 0.02267 0.0108 0.00045 0.00079 0.01322 0.0000
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Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables in the Sub-samples State and 
Top 50.
57GM4 is the proportion of the company owned by the state, is the estimate for
the marginal product of capital (refer to Appendix 2), A denotes the change in the 
respective variable horn the year before.
Top 50
Mean 0.0724 0.1074 0.4518 0.0155
Standard Deviation 0.2216 0.1094 0.2317 0.0604
Sample Variance 0.0491 0.0120 0.0537 0.0037
Minimum 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000
Maximum 1.0000 0.9287 1.0000 0.7511
Count 1054 1054 1054 1054
Top 50 A M P^ AOMW
Mean -0.0039 0.0002 0.0030 0.0011
Standard Deviation 0.0175 0.0199 0.0512 0.0135
Sample Variance 0.0003 0.0004 0.0026 0.0002
Minimum -0.1111 -0.1631 -0.3040 -0.1520
Maximum 0.0833 0.1930 0.3062 0.1497
Count 1054 1054 1054 1054
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State 57GM4 ORW
Mean 0.5976 0.0812 0.3643 0.1310
Standard Deviation 0.2872 0.0891 0.2524 0.1245
Sample Variance 0.0825 0.0079 0.0637 0.0155
Minimum 0.0100 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000
Maximum 1.0000 0.7813 0.9886 0.7511
Count 134 134 134 134
State AOMW
Mean -0.0310 -0.0005 0.0253 0.0082
Standard Deviation 0.0438 0.0166 0.0756 0.0375
Sample Variance 0.0019 0.0003 0.0057 0.0014
Minimum -0.1111 -0.0634 -0.3040 -0.1520
Maximum 0.0988 0.1380 03062 0.1497
Count 134 134 134 134
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